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The recent shift from ‘global villageism’ 
to the ‘new wars’ revealed a deep crisis in het-
erodox political economy. The popular belief 
in neoliberal globalization, peace dividends, 
fiscal conservatism and sound finance that 
dominated the 1980s and 1990s suddenly col-
lapsed.  The early 2000s brought rising xeno-
phobia, growing military budgets and policy 
profligacy. Radicals were the first to identify 
this transition, but their attempts to explain it 
have been bogged down by two major hurdles: 
(1) most writers continue to apply nineteenth 
century theories and concepts to twenty-first 
century realities; and (2) few seem to bother 
with empirical analysis.
This paper offers a radical alternative 
that is both theoretically new and empirically 
grounded. We use the ‘new wars’ as a stepping 
stone to understand a triple transformation 
that altered the nature of capital, the accumu-
lation of capital and the unit of capital. Specif-
ically, our argument builds on a power under-
standing of capital that emphasizes differen-
tial accumulation by dominant capital groups. 
Accumulation, we argue, has little to do with 
the amassment of material things measured 
in ‘utils’ or ‘abstract labor.’ Instead, accumu-
lation, or ‘capitalization,’ represents a com-
modification of power by leading groups in 
society. Over the past century, this power has 
been re-structured and concentrated through 
two distinct regimes of differential accumula-
tion—‘breadth’ and ‘depth.’ A breadth regime 
relies on proletarianization, on green-field 
investment and, particularly, on mergers and 
acquisitions. A depth regime builds on redis-
tribution through stagflation—that is, on dif-
ferential inf lation in the midst of stagnation. 
In contrast to breadth which presupposes 
some measure of growth and stability, depth 
thrives on ‘accumulation through crisis.’
The past twenty years were dominated 
by breadth, buttressed by neoliberal rheto-
ric, globalization and capital mobility. This 
regime started to run into mounting difficul-
ties in the late 1990s, and eventually collapsed 
in 2000. For differential accumulation to con-
tinue, dominant capital now needs inflation, 
and inflation requires instability and social 
crisis. It is within this broader dynamics of 
power accumulation that the new wars need 
to be understood.
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The new wars of the early 2000s mark a signiﬁ cant turning point in world aﬀ airs. During the 1980s and 1990s, it was popular to talk about the return 
of  ‘unregulated capitalism.’ It was the dawn of a new era, many said, the era 
of  ‘neoliberal globalization.’ Th e hallmarks of this new-old order appeared 
unmistakable. Falling budget deﬁ cits, tight monetary policy, deregulation, free 
trade and capital decontrols became the new orthodoxy. Th e ideological rheto-
ric spoke of  ‘democracy,’ ‘global villageism’ and ‘peace dividends.’ Th e welfare-
warfare state was on its way out. Laissez faire was back in fashion. Th e trajectory 
seemed so obvious that some were even tempted to announce the ‘end of his-
tory.’ 
In the early 2000s, though, the tables suddenly turned. Fiscal and mon-
etary policies were ‘loosened,’ ‘protectionist’ measures were reintroduced and 
the tidal wave of capital ﬂ ow turned to a trickle. Talk of a ‘global village’ quickly 
disappeared and was replaced by a global ‘war on terror.’ Democracy has given 
way to Homeland Security. Expectations for peace dividends have dissipated in 
favor of  ‘war proﬁ ts.’ History was back with a vengeance.
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Th e purpose of this paper is to situate this broad transition within an alter-
native understanding of capital accumulation. Th ere have been many insightful 
explanations for this transition in recent years, but the one presented here is 
diﬀ erent in two important respects. First, whereas most explanations attempt 
to reconcile the new trajectory with existing theories of accumulation, ours is 
based on a new framework altogether. Second, in contrast to most accounts, 
which are largely polemic, ours is empirical throughout.
1. the argument in a nutshell
We start with capital. Contemporary students of capitalism, hamstrung by 
nineteenth-century biases, continue to think of accumulation in the ‘material’ 
terms of labor, production and consumption. In our opinion, this emphasis has 
become insuﬃ  cient and misleading. Over the past century, capital has grown 
increasingly politicized in nature and ﬁ nancial in form. ‘Free competition’ and 
the formal separation of  ‘state’ and ‘capital’—where they existed—have given 
way to a far more complex interaction of  ‘dominant capital’ groups and ‘big 
government.’ Accumulation, which during the nineteenth century was anchored 
largely in proletarianization and technical advances, has come to depend more 
and more on corporate amalgamation and inﬂ ationary pricing. 
To deal with these new dimensions, this paper oﬀ ers an alternative concep-
tualization of capital, understood not as a material entity but as a power institu-
tion. What gets accumulated, we argue, is neither ‘utility’ nor ‘dead labor,’ but 
ﬁ nancial claims on expected future earnings. Th ese expected earnings, in turn, 
represent neither the ‘marginal productivity’ of capital nor ‘surplus value,’ but 
the way capitalists view the future structure of power in society. 
A power understanding of accumulation leads to diﬀ erent units of analysis. 
Marx diﬀ erentiated between three ‘types’ of capital owned by three correspond-
ing ‘fractions’ of the capitalist class—‘industrial,’ ‘commercial’ and ‘ﬁ nancial.’ 
Th is division is no longer tenable. All modern ownership is ﬁ nancial, and only 
ﬁ nancial. It is a claim on pecuniary earnings. And pecuniary earnings reﬂ ect 
not production or consumption, but power, and only power. Th is central role 
of power means that it is no longer enough to think in terms of capital ‘in gen-
eral’ and ‘individual capitals’ in competition. Instead, the attention should be 
focused on dominant capital—namely, on the largest power coalitions at the 
centre of the political economy. Diﬀ erent coalitions within dominant capital 
sometimes are associated with diﬀ erent ‘types’ of business activity, such as oil, 
weapons, telecommunication or ﬁ nancial intermediation. But these diﬀ erences 
are only partly, and sometimes not at all, related to the nature of  ‘production’ 
per se. Business is a matter of proﬁ t, and proﬁ t comes not from production, but 
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from power—the power to reshape the trajectory of social reproduction as a whole. 
Diﬀ erent segments within dominant capital are diﬀ erentiated by the nature of 
their power. Production, narrowly deﬁ ned, is merely an aspect of that power. 
Driven by the quest for power, the goal of these dominant capital groups is 
not absolute accumulation, but diﬀ erential accumulation. Th ey try not to maxi-
mize proﬁ t, but to beat the average and exceed the normal rate of return. Th ere 
is a big diﬀ erence between these two goals. Proﬁ t maximizers focus on their 
own earnings. By contrast, diﬀ erential accumulators also beneﬁ t, sometimes 
greatly, by lowering the earnings of others.
Th is diﬀ erence is reﬂ ected in the ‘mechanisms’ of accumulation. Traditional 
analysis of accumulation emphasizes the importance to accumulation of overall 
growth and price stability. But for dominant capital, diﬀ erential accumulation 
works best through mergers and acquisitions and through the redistributional 
eﬀ ects of stagﬂ ation (stagnation combined with inﬂ ation). And, indeed, during 
the twentieth century, with the progressive spread of dominant capital and dif-
ferential accumulation, there emerged an almost stylized cycle of diﬀ erential 
accumulation ‘regimes,’ oscillating between relatively long periods of corporate 
amalgamation and shorter periods of stagﬂ ation. 
Th e year 2000 seems to mark the beginning of yet another such oscillation: 
a long upswing of corporate amalgamation had just ended, and as these lines 
are being written (early 2003) there are signs that stagﬂ ation may be ready for a 
comeback. It is in this context that the current shift from neoliberalism to the 
new wars should be understood.
Traditional analyses of imperialism emphasized the beneﬁ t for accumula-
tion of territorial conquest, access to raw material and the expansion of mar-
kets. But with capital becoming increasingly political in nature and ﬁ nancial 
in form, the link between imperialism and accumulation has grown more com-
plex and subtle—to the point of making the very concept of  ‘imperialism’ seem 
questionable. Dominant capital has fabricated a whole new arsenal of accumu-
lation techniques. Th is arsenal allows it to increase its proﬁ ts immensely with-
out military conquest. New populations, new workers and new consumers are 
now brought under its ambit not through war, but through global corporate 
mergers. And when war does break out, dominant capital often supports it not 
for the added territory or the paciﬁ cation of a rival, but for the mere turmoil it 
creates. As it turns out, turmoil provides the breeding ground for stagﬂ ation, 
and stagﬂ ation fuels diﬀ erential accumulation. Mainstream economists think 
of inﬂ ation as a ‘neutral’ phenomenon, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Not 
only does inﬂ ation tend to come together with stagnation, but it also works to 
redistribute income—from workers to capitalists and from small ﬁ rms to large 
ones.
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Th e current shift toward war, and in particular the rekindling of conﬂ ict in 
the Middle East, is intimately connected with this new arsenal of accumulation. 
Of course, the reasons for war are always complicated and never singular, and 
the present historical junction is no exception. But as far as dominant capital 
is concerned, the ‘battle lines’ are relatively clear. For the leading accumulators, 
success and failure are a matter of diﬀ erential proﬁ t. Th eir goal is to ‘beat the 
average,’ and that makes them judge the world based on relative earnings. In 
their eyes, the key question is how war will aﬀ ect their diﬀ erential accumulation, 
immediately and in the longer run. And that is the question we need to begin 
with. 
Consider ﬁ rst the military contractors and oil companies. Th e interest of 
weapon companies in renewed conﬂ ict is pretty obvious, particularly after a 
decade of peace dividends, curtailed war budgets and dwindling arms exports. 
Th e interest of the oil companies, however, is more complicated and often mis-
understood. Contrary to popular belief, since the 1970s the oil companies, taken 
as a group, have become relatively impartial to ‘access rights’ and ‘drilling con-
cessions.’ As long as they remain the principal oﬀ -takers of crude oil, it does not 
matter much whether or not they own it. Th e key to their proﬁ t is not volume, 
but price. A higher price of crude oil means higher input costs for them; but it 
also means a much higher price for reﬁ ned products, and therefore much higher 
proﬁ ts at the bottom line. When crude oil prices go up, so do their proﬁ ts, and 
vice versa when the price of oil drops.
And what makes the price of oil go up and down? According to popular 
conception, the blame rests either with the ‘oil sheiks’ of OPEC or with the 
market forces of  ‘supply and demand.’ Th e reality of the oil business, however, 
is rather diﬀ erent. As it turns out, over the past thirty years the single most 
important factor aﬀ ecting the price of oil was the ebb and ﬂ ow of conﬂ ict in the 
Middle East.
Tension and war brought higher oil prices, which in turn led to higher oil 
revenues for OPEC and surging proﬁ ts for the oil companies. Local govern-
ments, ﬂ ooded with petroleum earnings, used those earnings to buy more weap-
ons, and their purchases helped enrich the arms exporters in the industrialized 
countries. Furthermore, as the region’s arsenals swelled, the groundwork for the 
next conﬂ ict was put in place. Th us, if the oil and armament groups surround-
ing the current Bush Administration have a broad interest here, clearly it is an 
interest in some measure of instability and war, not peace.
Of course, the armament and oil companies are not the only ones that need 
to be considered. Most big companies have little to do with the sale of either 
weapons or oil, and practically all are users of energy. So are these companies 
not set to lose from war and higher energy prices? Th e answer is ‘yes and no.’ If 
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oil prices were to continue rising, the Microsofts, General Motors and Vivendis 
of this world would likely fall behind the ExxonMobils and Lockheed Martins. 
And indeed, the prospect of such loss of primacy has already contributed to 
some squabbling between and within Western governments on precisely how 
much violence should be inﬂ icted on the Middle East. However, considering 
the stakes involved, the struggle so far has been rather muted. One possible 
reason is that most large companies believe that the new wars will indeed con-
tribute to world stability and lower oil prices. But there is another possibility, 
namely, that these companies expect greater instability and higher prices, but 
view this outcome as desirable—even if it causes them to lose primacy to the oil 
and armament ﬁ rms. 
Th e logic behind this preference is as follows. Presently (early 2003), the 
biggest danger facing dominant capital as a whole is deﬂ ation. Th e global debt 
burden is heavier than at any previous point in history, roughly twice what it was 
on the eve of the Great Depression. Corporate pricing power, however, has been 
declining for more than twenty years and is now the weakest it has been since 
the late 1950s. Under these circumstances, if disinﬂ ation were to give way to fall-
ing prices, the specter of chain bankruptcies and debt deﬂ ation could make the 
Great Depression look like child’s play. Given this risk, any move toward higher 
inﬂ ation—even when accompanied by stagnation—is the lesser evil and would 
be welcomed with a sigh of relief.
A likely trigger for higher inﬂ ation is higher oil prices. Th at, at least, has 
been the pattern since the late 1960s. Over the past forty years, higher oil prices 
have always led to higher inﬂ ation, and if they do so again dominant capital 
will likely ﬁ nd the outcome desirable. Furthermore, once the deﬂ ation threat is 
defused, the icing on the cake would be the reinvigoration of diﬀ erential accu-
mulation. As noted, inﬂ ation tends to redistribute income from labor to capital 
and from small ﬁ rms to larger ones. And if this pattern continues to hold, the 
net eﬀ ect on dominant capital would end up being positive.
Oil producing countries in and outside OPEC obviously are more ambiva-
lent. Th e explicit shift toward interventionism on the part of the United States 
and its Western allies must be worrying for them. OPEC is the only interna-
tional cartel that managed to obtain some degree of  ‘autonomy’ from Western 
inﬂ uence, and now this autonomy is in great danger. At the same time, however, 
part of the cartel’s lingering weakness stems precisely from its inability to keep 
prices high—something which a new era of conﬂ ict ‘managed’ by direct U.S. 
intervention may help remedy.
Needless to say, these arguments leave many questions open. For example, 
does dominant capital understand its interests in this way, and therefore qui-
etly support the new wars? Are the oil and armament companies sophisticated 
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enough to ‘engineer’ such roundabout accumulation strategies? Do they have 
the necessary muscle to stir the U.S. government into such adventures? What is 
the opposition standing against them—from within dominant capital and from 
the underlying population more broadly? What are the consequences of these 
developments for the broader ‘functioning’ of contemporary capitalism? And 
how should we embed these considerations in the larger context of regional and 
global politics, cultural change and religious conﬂ ict? Th ese are all important 
questions that deserve a study far more extensive than what can be attempted 
here. But, then, our purpose is not to write the ﬁ nal word on the issue, but 
rather to outline an alternative approach and invite others to debate it.
2. capital accumulation²
What do we mean by the term ‘accumulation’?  Most people would probably 
consider this a trivial query: you accumulate when you become richer, you decu-
mulate when you become poorer. And that is certainly part of the answer—but 
not the whole answer. Suppose your dollar assets grew by 10 percent last year. 
Suppose further that the overall price level—measured by the GDP price deﬂ a-
tor—also grew at the same rate of 10 percent. Since, on average, everything cost 
10 percent more, your ‘purchasing power’ remained the same even though the 
nominal value of your assets had risen. Clearly, your ‘wealth,’ measured in terms 
of what you can acquire, has not changed. In this sense, you have not accumu-
lated. For this reason, economists—conservative and radical alike—argue that 
accumulation should be measured not in nominal dollars and cents, but in ‘real 
terms.’ 
Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Of course, national statisti-
cians produce measurements of the ‘real’ capital stock as a matter of course, but 
the meaning of these measurements is anything but clear. Th e statistical pro-
cedure itself is simple enough. You take the overall value of capital equipment 
and structures denominated in dollars and cents—for instance, the dollar value 
of all factories in the automobile industry—and divide this value by the price 
index for automobile factories. On the face of it, the eﬀ ect is to ‘purge’ from the 
nominal value of capital the impact of changing prices. For example, if the dollar 
value of automobile factories in our example rose by 20 percent, and if 5 percent 
².  For detailed expositions of our view on capital, power and diﬀ erential accumula-
tion covered in Sections –, see Nitzan (), Nitzan and Bichler (a) and Bichler 
and Nitzan (b: ch. ).
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of the increase was due to a rise in the price of a typical factory, the statistician, 
after subtracting the latter from the former, could tell us that the ‘real’ rate of 
accumulation was 15 percent; in other words, that the ‘quantity’ of factories, 
as distinct from their ‘nominal’ value, expanded by 15 percent. A clean, simple 
computation, no doubt. But does it really measure the rate of  ‘accumulation’?
Consider the following facts. An ‘automobile factory’—and any other fac-
tory for that matter—is made of many diﬀ erent tools, machines and struc-
tures. Over time, the ‘nature’ of these items tends to change. Th ey may take less 
time and eﬀ ort to produce; they may become more productive due to techni-
cal improvement or less productive because of wear and tear; their composi-
tion may change with new machines replacing older ones; they may be used to 
produce diﬀ erent and even entirely new output; etc. Th e result of these many 
changes is that today’s automobile factories are not the same as yesterday’s, or 
as last year’s. Th e price index of automobile factories, however, is supposed to 
track, over time, the price of the very same factories. Th e obvious question, then, 
is how such an index could be computed when the underlying factories—the 
‘things’ whose price the index is supposed to measure—keep changing from one 
year to the next? 
Clearly, in order to measure the price of capital, we must ﬁ rst denominate 
its underlying ‘substance’ in some homogenous units. Neoclassical economists 
have solved the problem by saying that machines, factories and structures could 
all be reduced to universal units of  ‘productive capacity,’ counted in terms of the 
utility they generate. In this way, an automobile factory capable of producing 
1,000 ‘utils’ is equivalent to two factories each producing 500 ‘utils.’ As factories 
change over time, we can simply measure their changing ‘magnitude’ in terms of 
their greater or lesser ‘util-generating capacity.’ 
In contrast to the neoclassicists, Marx approached the problem from the 
input side, arguing that capital, like any other commodity, could be quantiﬁ ed 
in terms of the socially necessary ‘abstract labor’ required to produce it. So if 
we begin with an automobile factory that takes, on average, 10 million hours of 
abstract labor to construct, and add to it another factory that takes, on average, 
only 5 million hours to build, we end up with an aggregate capital whose ‘mag-
nitude’ is equivalent to 15 million hours of abstract labor.
Do these ‘procedures’ solve the problem of separating price from quantity? 
Not in the least. Indeed, had we known the ‘productivity’ or ‘abstract labor con-
tents’ of capital, that knowledge would already tell us what the ‘real’ magnitude 
of capital is, making the whole statistical exercise redundant. Will political 
economists ever come to ‘know’ these universal units, so that they can dispense 
with the make-believe process of separating price from quantity? Perhaps. But 
so far they have not, and until they do—which we think will be never—the 
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meaning of all statistical measures of  ‘real’ capital will remain unclear.³ 
Ironically, even if we could somehow come up with a ‘real’ measure of capi-
tal, that would not really matter for our purpose. Th e reason is simple: the real 
interest of capitalists has nothing to do with the so-called ‘real’ rate of accu-
mulation. Th e Ford family, Bill Gates, the Bronfmans, George Soros—and, 
for that matter, all contemporary capitalists, including the managers of mutual 
funds and the directors of the large corporations—do not care about the ‘pur-
chasing power’ of their capital. Similarly, they do not care about the ‘productive 
capacity’ of their machines. And they do not care about how much ‘abstract 
labor’ went into producing what they own. Of course, they do care very much 
about the nominal value of their assets. Under the price system of capitalism, 
says Th orstein Veblen, ‘men have come to the conviction that money-values are 
more real and substantial than any of the material facts in this transitory world’ 
(Veblen 1923: 88). And there is a reason for this conviction.
Present-day capitalists own not ‘means of production,’ but a ﬁ nancial claim 
on corporate earnings.⁴ Th is fact is true for all capitalists, whether they own 
an automobile company, a software ﬁ rm, a bank, a media conglomerate or a 
diversiﬁ ed ﬁ nancial portfolio. In this sense, we can no longer diﬀ erentiate 
between ‘industrial,’ ‘commercial’ and ‘ﬁ nancial’ capitalists. Th e emergence in 
³.  In order to denote the ‘substance’ of capital in universal units, political econo-
mists would need to overcome three obstacles, all of which are insurmountable. First, 
they would have to explain how we can convert qualitatively diﬀ erent outputs into uni-
versal ‘utils ’ (in the neoclassical case), or qualitatively diﬀ erent forms of concrete labor 
into homogenous units of  ‘abstract labor’ (in the Marxist case). Second, they would have 
to identify the particular  ‘utils ’ produced by a particular type of capital (neoclassical), or 
the exact number of abstract labor hours that went (on average) into making a particular 
type of machine (Marxist). And, third, they would have to show that the capital mea-
surements they came up with were indeed unique; in other words, that the ‘substance’ 
we call a factory, when measured as ‘capital,’ has one quantity, and one quantity only. On 
the impossible ‘conversion’ of quality into quantity, see for example Castoriadis (), 
Nitzan () and Bichler and Nitzan (a). Th e issue of input-output indeterminacy 
was pointed out by Steadman (; ). Th e problem of providing a unique measure 
of  ‘real’ capital was ﬁ rst identiﬁ ed by Veblen (; ) and Wicksell (), and later 
gave rise to the ‘Cambridge Controversies’ of the s and s (Cf. Robinson -
; Sraﬀ a ; Harcourt ). 
⁴.  Note that that the ‘objects’ owned by the corporation, such as factories and struc-
tures, are merely instrumental to proﬁ t: they derive their capitalization not from their 
‘productivity’ or their cost of production, but from the earnings they are expected to 
generate.
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the late nineteenth century of the corporations as the principal form of owner-
ship turned all capitalists into ﬁ nancial capitalists. Furthermore, with extensive 
conglomeration and crossholdings it is no longer possible to apply the catego-
ries of  ‘industry,’ ‘commerce’ and ‘ﬁ nance’ even to the corporations themselves. 
Finally, and crucially, even within the corporation we cannot know how much 
proﬁ t comes from ‘industry’ as opposed to ‘commerce’ or ‘ﬁ nance.’ It is true that 
many large companies provide data on sales and proﬁ ts broken by ‘business 
segment’ and ‘line of activity.’ But these breakdowns, based as they are on intra-
company transfer pricing, are forever arbitrary. Th ey could be made as large 
or small as desired and therefore give us no deﬁ nite insight as to the ultimate 
‘source’ of proﬁ t.⁵ 
In short, there is a decisive ‘break’ between the material facts of production 
and the ﬁ nancial reality of accumulation. Th is break was well understood by 
Marx already in the middle of the nineteenth century (cf. Marx 1909: vol. 3, 
Part V). But in order to defend his notion of  ‘actual capital,’ which he believed 
was made of surplus abstract labor, ﬁ nancial accumulation had to be classi-
ﬁ ed as ‘ﬁ ctitious.’ More than a century later, though, the dialectics of capitalist 
development have completely inverted his classiﬁ cation. Th ese days, the only 
‘actual’ capital is ﬁ nance. It is readily observable and measurable, it is the only 
capital capitalists care about, it moves the world. By contrast, capital counted 
in abstract labor is entirely ‘ﬁ ctitious.’ It cannot be observed, it cannot be mea-
sured, and it is of no interest to capitalists or their managers. It cannot tell us 
anything about the actual process of accumulation. 
And, so, although ‘production’ in its narrow sense matters a great deal for 
capitalism, it does not—and indeed cannot—provide either the quantitative 
code for accumulation or the benchmark against which accumulation should 
be assessed. Accumulation is a matter of power, and, accordingly, the yardstick 
capitalists use to assess their success or failure cannot be absolute. It has to 
be relative. Capitalists compare their accumulation not to articles of utility or 
hours of labor, but to the ‘normal’ rate of accumulation itself.
3. differential accumulation
A capitalist investing in Canadian 10-year bonds typically tries to beat the 
Scotia McLeod 10-year benchmark; an owner of emerging market equities tries 
⁵. Th ese problems are well known to national accounting statisticians. Th e U.S. 
Department of Commerce, for instance, warns users that its proﬁ t data are based on 
company reports, and that their classiﬁ cation by industry is ‘inaccurate’ to an unknown 
extent (U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis ). 
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to beat the IFC benchmark; investors in global commodities try to beat the 
Economist index; owners of large U.S. corporations try to beat the S&P 500; 
and so on. Every investment is normally stacked against some benchmark. To 
seek ‘absolute’ returns in our day and age is to be exotic indeed.⁶ Neoclassi-
cal economists never tire of talking about ‘proﬁ t maximization,’ although real 
investors would not know what that meant even if they cared.⁷ Th eir own goal 
is diﬀ erential accumulation. 
On the face of it, this emphasis on diﬀ erential ﬁ nancial gain may seem 
overblown. Present day capitalists certainly think in nominal terms; and, yes, 
they do try to beat the average. But in so doing, are they not simply chasing 
their own tail? And why should studying this game be important for politi-
cal economy? After all, everyone knows that ﬁ nancial markets are a ‘bubble’ of 
hype and deﬂ ation whose booms and busts are pretty much ‘delinked’ from the 
‘real’ processes of production and proﬁ t. Looking at how investors behave may 
be interesting, even entertaining, but how much can it tell us about the underly-
ing social reality? 
Th e short answer is: plenty. Finance and diﬀ erential accumulation are not a 
sideshow. Finance is the main ‘language’ of capital, while diﬀ erential accumula-
tion is its principal ‘generative order.’ Together, they produce many of the ‘expli-
cate’ phenomena of contemporary capitalism and oﬀ er a key to understanding 
some of its most fundamental processes.⁸ 
⁶.  Peter Martin, a Financial Times columnist, clearly is sailing against the wind 
when he calls on fund managers to abandon their  ‘fetish’ for relative performance in favor 
of absolute returns (Martin ). Some hedge funds have tried to do just that—i.e., 
achieve a pre-determined rate of return—but as another Financial Times commentator 
explains, their strategy is tantamount to having their cake and eating it too. In the end, 
‘absolute return strategies’ are attractive only insofar as they manage to beat the aver-
age…. (Anonymous ).
⁷.  Th e idea of proﬁ t maximization was ﬁ rst challenged during the Great Depression 
by the empirical works of Means () and Hall and Hitch (). Initially, their stud-
ies stirred up considerable controversy and debate, but with the post-war victory of the 
‘neoclassical synthesis’ of Keynesian macroeconomics and neoclassical microeconomics, 
the issue was ceremoniously swept under the carpet (see Lee ; Lee et al. –).
⁸.  On the notions of explicate and generative orders, see Bohm and Peat () and 
Bohm ().
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Finance and ‘Reality’
Take the popular ‘delinking thesis.’ According to this theory, equity prices 
have no basis in ‘reality.’ In buying and selling stocks, investors are simply trying 
to guess what other investors think, in inﬁ nite regress, a process which inevitably 
makes them lose sight of anything related to the ‘real’ economy. As John Maynard 
Keynes put it, ‘We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelli-
gences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. 
And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, ﬁ fth and higher degrees’ 
(Keynes 1936: 156). Th is view has become popular, and it certainly rings true if you 
spend too much time observing ‘day trading’ and the stock market ﬂ oor. But as an 
explanation of the market’s long term trajectory it is dangerously misleading.
Figure 1 – S&P 500: Price and Earnings*
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
Price
Earnings per Share
1871=100
log scale
*   The S&P 500 index splices the following three series: the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s 
Composite (1871–1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926–1957); and the S&P 500 (1957-
present). Earnings per share are computed as the ratio of price to price/earnings.
Source: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for price; SPPECOMW for price/earnings).
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Consider Figure 1. Th e chart shows the long-term development of the Stan-
dard and Poor’s 500 index (s&p 500), which measures the average stock price of 
the 500 largest companies listed in the United States. Th e Figure also plots the 
average earnings per share of these companies. Evidently, the two series have 
not moved together exactly, showing marked discrepancies in their year-to-year 
ﬂ uctuations (note the log scale). But over the longer term their correlation—
measuring 0.95 out of a maximum value of 1—is nothing short of remarkable. 
In other words, the stock market may be based on subjective speculation (which 
it certainly is), but it is a speculation tightly correlated with the capitalist reality of 
proﬁ t. 
Should this long-term correlation surprise us? Not really. When a capital-
ist buys a share in a company, she buys a portion of that company. But what she 
pays for are not the machines, structures, or workers of the company. Rather, 
she pays for the company’s ability to generate profit. And how much she pays for 
this ability is proportionate to how much profit the firm is expected to gener-
ate.⁹ This relationship can be symbolically stated, so that:
 rate of accumulation  ≈   rate of growth of future profit
We can further simplify this expression by noting that, over the longer haul, 
profit expectations tend to oscillate around the path of actual profit, so that: 
rate of accumulation  ≈  rate of growth of profit
In other words, what we see in Figure 1 is not a f luke correlation between the 
so-called ‘speculative’ fervor of finance and the ‘reality’ of profit, but a relation-
ship deeply grounded in the inner logic of accumulation. Over the longer haul, the 
‘delinking thesis’ is wrong, not only empirically but also theoretically. 
Differential Accumulation: Passive and Active
Now, let us think of what it takes to achieve diﬀ erential accumulation; that 
is, to have the capitalist’s own capital, measured in dollars, expand faster than 
the average. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that the capitalist invests in 
equities, and suppose further that he systematically beats the s&p 500 bench-
mark. To enjoy such a feat, the proﬁ ts of the companies he owns must grow 
⁹.  We are abstracting here from the other dimension of stock pricing—namely, risk 
perceptions, the rate of interest and investors’ hype (the later denoting the ex-post ratio 
of expected to actual proﬁ t). Th ese factors are largely cyclical and therefore important 
mostly in the short and medium term. In the longer run, they are necessarily secondary 
to the exponential growth of proﬁ t.
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faster than the average proﬁ t of the 500 ﬁ rms included in the s&p 500 index.¹⁰ 
And as his own proﬁ ts rise faster than the average, his relative share of total 
proﬁ t grows as well. In other words, to accumulate diﬀ erentially and to increase 
your distributive share of proﬁ t are two side of the same process.
Th ere are two basic ways to beat the average: the ‘passive’ and the ‘active.’ 
Th e passive method, typical of minority owners, is to buy those assets whose 
proﬁ ts you expect to grow faster than the average—but whose prices are pres-
ently ‘undervalued’ relative to this ‘eventual’ outcome—and wait. In due course, 
or so you hope, other investors will come around to think as you do, bid up the 
price of your stocks relative to the average, and in the process cause you to accu-
mulate diﬀ erentially. Two glaring examples of this strategy are George Soros’ 
Quantum Fund and Warren Buﬀ ett’s Berkshire Hathaway. Between 1969 and 
1997, Soros recorded annual total returns averaging 33 percent, compared with 
13 percent for the s&p 500, while Buﬀ ett, nicknamed the ‘Sage of Omaha,’ scored 
an annual average of 22 percent over the 1965–2002 period, compared with 10 
percent for the s&p 500.¹¹ 
And yet, as they grow bigger, successful ‘passive’ investors increasingly 
ﬁ nd themselves compelled to pursue more ‘active’ methods. In the 1960s, Soros 
and Buﬀ ett were small enough to buy and sell without signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ecting 
the price of their underlying assets. Th at was no longer true in the 1990s. Sys-
tematic diﬀ erential accumulation had made them too big for a strictly pas-
sive strategy. As a capitalist, it is no longer easy to ‘buy cheap’ when your large 
purchases quickly drive up the price, or to ‘sell dear’ when unloading assets en 
masse quickly depresses their price. At that point, you are more or less forced to 
become active, which is what gradually happened to Soros, Buﬀ ett and scores 
of other large fund mangers and institutional investors.
Th e active method, typical of majority, or ‘eﬀ ective’ owners, contains the 
added ingredient of direct intervention. Instead of merely waiting in the hope 
that proﬁ ts will grow diﬀ erentially, you take deliberate action in order to make 
sure they do grow diﬀ erentially. Individually, dominant capital groups engage 
in both methods. But it is the latter method—namely, the active attempt to 
aﬀ ect proﬁ t—that makes systematic diﬀ erential accumulation possible in the 
¹⁰.  Again, we are abstracting from shorter term variations in diﬀ erential risk and 
hype alluded to in footnote .
¹¹. Total return comprises capital appreciation and reinvested dividends. 
Figures computed from Reier (), Buﬀ ett (: ) and Global Financial Data.
http://www.globalﬁ ndata.com
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ﬁ rst place. Without someone being ‘active,’ there could be no systematic growth 
in diﬀ erential proﬁ t; and without such growth the passive method becomes 
untenable.
Capital and Power
Th e emphasis here on active ‘human agency’ is crucial, and all the more 
so since existing theories of accumulation tend to ignore it. For the neoclas-
sicists, capitalists can try to increase their proﬁ t until they are blue in the face. 
It will not help them. In a competitive market, proﬁ t is equal to the productive 
contribution of capital, not to the eﬀ ort of its owner. Karl Marx ridiculed the 
notion that capital could be ‘productive.’ Only labor was productive. Th e source 
of proﬁ t was the institution of private ownership, which left the means of pro-
duction in the hands of capitalists and forced workers to settle for wages lower 
than the value of their output. In this scheme, Marx recognized the power 
foundations of capital—the power of capital over labor. Paradoxically, however, 
beyond this abstract recognition, his analysis of accumulation left little room 
for concrete power. 
Of course, Marx was the ﬁ rst to note the growth of big business and the 
formative role of the state in the genesis of capitalism, themes that were later 
developed by neo-Marxist state theorists and the analysts of monopoly capi-
talism. But to emphasize these aspects of power was to undermine the labor 
theory of value. Th is latter theory relied heavily on the Newtonian assump-
tions of atomistic competition, the free mobility of capital and labor, and the 
lack of  ‘intervening’ factors such as governments—all of which assumptions 
were compromised by the ascent of giant corporations and big government. Th e 
result was an increasingly sophisticated explanation of capitalist power built on 
an increasingly shaky theory of capital accumulation. 
Monopoly Capital theorists took a step forward, by emphasizing the role 
of centralized power in mature capitalism and by recognizing that such power 
made labor values more or less irrelevant for the actual trajectory of prices and 
proﬁ ts. But they failed to take the next logical step, namely to rethink the impli-
cation of power for the concept of capital itself. Th is failure was candidly acknowl-
edged by Paul Sweezy in his assessment of Monopoly Capital, a book which he 
wrote together with Paul Baran twenty-ﬁ ve years earlier:
Why did Monopoly Capital fail to anticipate the changes in the structure 
and functioning of the system that have taken place in the last twenty-five 
years? Basically, I think the answer is that its conceptualization of the capital 
accumulation process is one-sided and incomplete. In the established tradition of 
both mainstream and Marxian economics, we treated capital accumulation 
as being essentially a matter of adding to the stock of existing capital goods. 
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But in reality this is only one aspect of the process. Accumulation is also a 
matter of adding to the stock of financial assets. The two aspects are of course 
interrelated, but the nature of this interrelation is problematic to say the least. 
The traditional way of handling the problem has been in effect to assume 
it away: for example, buying stocks and bonds (two of the simpler forms of 
financial assets) is assumed to be merely an indirect way of buying real capital 
goods. This is hardly ever true, and it can be totally misleading. This is not 
the place to try to point the way to a more satisfactory conceptualization of 
the capital accumulation process. It is at best an extremely complicated and 
difficult problem, and I am frank to say that I have no clues to its solution. 
But I can say with some confidence that achieving a better understanding of 
the monopoly capitalist society of today will be possible only on the basis of a more 
adequate theory of capital accumulation, with special emphasis on the inter-
action of its real and financial aspects, than we now possess. (Sweezy , 
emphasis added)
4. capital as power
In our view, the alternative is to think not of accumulation and power, but 
of accumulation as power.¹² Th e Marxist belief, according to which surplus 
value is ﬁ rst ‘produced’ by industrial capitalists and then ‘redistributed’ through 
intra-class power struggle among the diﬀ erent fractions of the capitalist class, 
is a grand myth which has run its course. Instead, we argue that all capitalized 
earnings, regardless of their ‘source,’ are reﬂ ections/expressions of power—the 
power of capitalists to shape and transform the course of society to their own 
ends. What is being ‘capitalized,’ always, is not abstract labor, but power itself. 
And since power, by its very nature, is diﬀ erential, so is accumulation. Th is is 
the crux of the matter.
Capitalizing Power
Consider the example of Microsoft. In 2000, the company earned $9.4 
billion in net proﬁ t—roughly 70 percent of all global software proﬁ t—and 
boasted a market capitalization of some $310 billion (Anonymous 1999b; 
Moody’s Online). Th is proﬁ t and capitalization, though, bore little relation to 
the ‘productivity’ of the company’s workers or to the cost of producing software. 
¹².  Our ‘equating’ of capital to power is metaphorical, of course. But as Arhtur 
Koestler (; ) amply demonstrates, metaphors, or ‘bisociations,’ as he calls them, 
are essential for creativity, including in science. ‘Metaphoric perception,’ say David Bohm 
and David Peat, ‘is, indeed, fundamental to all science and involves bringing together 
previously incompatible ideas in radically new ways’ (: ).
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Instead, they were entirely dependent on intellectual property rights, on the 
state sanction that backed up these rights, and on Microsoft’s ability to harness 
this sanction to its own diﬀ erential ends. For this reason, it does not matter 
whether Microsoft spent billions of dollars to ‘invent’ its programs, or instead 
appropriated them gratis from others. Either way, the programs take only a few 
dollars’ worth of CDs to ‘reproduce,’ to the byte. Th e only barrier preventing 
this latter act is the law. Remove the threat of penalty for such ‘procreation,’ and 
Microsoft’s proﬁ t and capitalization would quickly collapse to zero. Microsoft 
may be a ‘knowledge company,’ whatever that means, but its diﬀ erential proﬁ t-
ability depends squarely and solely on the politics of knowledge.¹³
Or take Citigroup. Th e relative proﬁ t growth of this ﬁ nancial conglom-
erate, like that of similar companies, depends, among other things, on inter-
est rates. And interest rates, as we know, are aﬀ ected by monetary policy. Th is 
‘symbiosis’ between private proﬁ t and state action makes Citigroup’s diﬀ erential 
accumulation depend on its ability to aﬀ ect monetary policy; and to the extent 
that it does, part of Citigroup’s assets represents a ‘capitalization of the state.’ 
Or think of General Motors. GM, together with seven other automobile 
companies, controls the world market for cars and trucks. Th e diﬀ erential proﬁ t 
of GM depends on its tacit and open collusion with these other companies. But 
it also depends on much more. It depends on the highway system provided by 
the government, as well as the convenient lack of alternative public transporta-
tion; it depends on environmental regulation or lack thereof; it depends on the 
ups and downs in the price of oil; it depends on tax arrangements with various 
governments and on a complicated global system of  ‘transfer pricing’; it depends 
on a sophisticated propaganda war which creates wants and shapes desires; it 
depends on the relative strength of its labor unions; and so on and on. GM’s 
diﬀ erential proﬁ t also depends on its huge credit operations, and therefore on 
monetary policy; and it depends on the company’s military business, and there-
fore on the global politics of armament and the ‘threat’ of conﬂ ict. In this con-
text, the ‘production’ of automobiles as such is not the ‘source’ of accumulation, 
but rather one dimension of a complex order through which GM develops and 
expands its relative social power.
¹³.  Not surprisingly, Microsoft earns most of its proﬁ ts from sales in developed 
countries such as the United States, where software piracy could cost you up to ﬁ ve years 
in jail. Most developing countries have not yet perfected the penal system for such acts, 
and until they  ‘develop’ in that direction, their contribution to Microsoft’s bottom line is 
likely to remain negligible. 
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Another illustration: advertising ﬁ rms. Companies such as the Interpub-
lic Group, Omnicom and Publicis bypass the sublimations of liberal ideology 
altogether. Th ey do not sell a product; they sell power—the power to shape 
the minds of human beings. Th e more eﬀ ective their brainwashing, the greater 
their relative proﬁ t and diﬀ erential capitalization. Th eir capitalization, quite 
literally, is the capitalization of diﬀ erential power.
A ﬁ nal example—the oil companies. As we shall see later, over the past 
thirty years the diﬀ erential proﬁ ts of these companies have had little to do with 
the production of oil—and almost everything to do with its price. And the price 
of oil in turn has had little to do with ‘supply and demand’ and everything to 
do with the global political economy in general and the political economy of 
the Middle East in particular. So here, too, proﬁ t is a matter of politics, which 
means that assets capitalize power.
What these examples serve to illustrate is simple. Th e so-called ‘process of 
production,’ narrowly understood, constitutes one of several explicate ‘media’ 
through which proﬁ t is generated. But that medium alone still tells us very little 
about proﬁ tability and accumulation as such. In order to decipher these latter 
processes, we have to go beyond the narrow understanding of  ‘production’ and 
unpack the general and concrete nature of capitalist power and its oppositions.
Our own starting point is to recognize that contemporary capitalism is 
obsessed with the diﬀ erential accumulation of ﬁ nancial values. Individual capi-
talists can accumulate diﬀ erentially simply by gambling on ‘undervalued’ assets 
whose underlying proﬁ t they expect will grow diﬀ erentially. But somebody has 
to make these proﬁ ts grow diﬀ erentially in the ﬁ rst place, and that requires 
power. Power, in other words, lies at the very heart of accumulation. To under-
stand accumulation is to understand power under capitalism, and vice versa.
Politics, Ruling Class and Accumulation Through Crisis
Th e double-sided nature of power and accumulation is important for 
many reasons, of which we should highlight three. First and foremost it forces 
us to think of accumulation itself as a political process. From this viewpoint, 
the ‘political’ dimension is not some sort of a superstructure built on top 
of  ‘material’ accumulation, a mechanism for the redistribution of values previ-
ously created in the productive sphere. Instead, politics, broadly understood, is 
the very crux of accumulation. Making politics the focus of our attention enables 
us to defuse the anonymity of  ‘capitalist forces,’ demystify ‘competition,’ and 
go beyond the vagueness of  ‘the state,’ ‘the capitalist class’ and ‘the capitalist 
system as a whole.’ 
More speciﬁ cally within this context, the second reason for the focus 
on power is that it helps us to think of capital accumulation and ruling class 
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dynamics as two sides of the same process. Diﬀ erential accumulation implies the 
existence of a ‘dominant capital’ group which accumulates faster than the aver-
age. And the fact that this group generally succeeds in achieving diﬀ erential 
accumulation in turn implies its intimate involvement in central power pro-
cesses—including government, the law, ideology, mass persuasion, interna-
tional organizations, etc. In this sense, dominant capital, by its very nature, 
must become increasingly fused—although never entirely synonymous—with 
the ruling class in contemporary capitalism. Th e ‘extent’ to which dominant 
capital is able to shape the social process is imprinted on the annals of the stock 
and bond markets in the form of relative ﬁ nancial performance. Th is diﬀ eren-
tial performance is not an ‘objective’ measure of power. Rather, it is a measure 
of how the ruling capitalist class conceives of and universalizes such power in its 
own mind, how it assesses its own success and failure, and how it tries to impose 
this understanding on the rest of society. Th ese features make diﬀ erential accu-
mulation a highly ‘symbolic’ process. But it is a very real symbol, with very real 
causes and very real consequences.
From this viewpoint, to understand present day capitalism is to articulate 
the ‘link’ between the qualitative quest to shape capitalism on the one hand and 
the quantitative trajectory of diﬀ erential accumulation on the other. Th is bridge, 
of course, is forever speculative. But we can certainly use it to tell a compelling 
story, based on a consistent framework, supported by evidence, and subject to 
some standards of refutation.
Th e third reason for emphasizing the duality of accumulation and power 
concerns the issue of crisis. Radical theories deal extensively with accumula-
tion crises. But with diﬀ erential accumulation there emerges the mischievous 
possibility of accumulation through crisis. If capital is taken to denote an amass-
ment of material things or dead labor, it is only natural to equate its accumula-
tion with ‘economic growth.’ But if what gets accumulated is power measured 
through diﬀ erential ownership titles, it is clear that the process can take place 
with production decreasing as well as increasing, and with price inﬂ ation as well 
as price stability. Th e language of power and domination is not the same as the 
language of production and livelihood. And sometimes—indeed often—power 
can be greatly augmented precisely by undermining production. 
5. regimes of differential accumulation¹⁴
How can dominant capital achieve diﬀ erential accumulation? Analytically, 
there are two methods of doing so, which we call breadth and depth. To illustrate 
the meaning of these concepts, think of the dollar level of corporate proﬁ t as 
a product of two components: (i) the size of the corporate organization, mea-
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sured by the number of employees; and (ii) proﬁ t per employee, measured in 
dollars, so that:
profit = (employment)  ·  (profit / employment)
Labeling the first brackets ‘breadth’ and the second ‘depth,’ we have:
profit = breadth  ·  depth
Now, think about this equation in relative, or diﬀ erential, terms. As a 
dominant capitalist you increase breadth in absolute terms by increasing your 
employment; you increase breadth in relative terms by increasing your diﬀ er-
ential employment—that is, by increasing your own employment faster than the 
average. For example, if average employment growth is 5 percent, and dominant 
capital expands its labor force by 7 percent, we say that diﬀ erential breadth is 2 
percent (the diﬀ erence between the two). 
Following the same logic, to increase depth is to raise your proﬁ t per 
employee; to increase your diﬀ erential depth is to raise your proﬁ t per employee 
faster than the average. If the average proﬁ t per employee grows by 10 percent and 
dominant capital achieves 14 percent, diﬀ erential depth is 4 percent. 
Each of these methods—breadth and depth—can be further subdivided 
into external and internal avenues, leading to a four-way classiﬁ cation illustrated 
in Table 1.
External breadth takes place when you hire new workers and create new, 
green-ﬁ eld capacity faster than the average. Internal breadth occurs when you 
take over existing capacity and workers through mergers and acquisitions; that 
is, by buying other companies. Individually, large ﬁ rms engage in both methods; 
but as a group, their diﬀ erential breadth is determined almost entirely by the 
latter. ‘One capitalist always kills many,’ observed Karl Marx in the nineteenth 
century (1909: vol. 1, p. 836). And, indeed, the twentieth-century growth of big 
¹⁴.  For a fuller theoretical and empirical discussion of diﬀ erential accumulation 
regimes, see Nitzan () and Nitzan and Bichler (: ch. ).
Table 1 – Regimes of Diﬀerential Accumulation
InternalExternal
Breadth
Depth
Mergers & Acquisitions
Cost-cutting
Green-field
Stagflation
Shimshon Bichler & Jonathan Nitzan274
business was achieved mostly by amalgamation, with large ﬁ rms buying existing 
capacity rather than building it (see for instance, Scherer and Ross 1990: chs. 
3 and 5).
Internal depth refers to the ability of large ﬁ rms to increase proﬁ t per 
employee by cutting cost faster than the average. External depth denotes the 
capacity of large ﬁ rms to do the same by increasing prices faster than the aver-
age. Again, individually, dominant capital ﬁ rms try to do both, sometimes 
simultaneously. But over the longer haul it is mostly the latter method that 
matters for diﬀ erential depth. Cost cutting, of course, is pursued relentlessly 
by both large and small ﬁ rms. However, since it is diﬃ  cult to exclude others 
from using new production techniques and from taking advantage of cheaper 
input prices, the net impact of cost cutting is mostly to meet the average rather 
than beat it. Historically, the main gains in diﬀ erential depth have come from 
dominant capital raising its prices faster than the average, a process which at the 
aggregate level appears as stagﬂ ation. 
Now, to most readers, these claims would seem counterintuitive, if not pre-
posterous. In the popular conception, growth often is used as a synonym for 
accumulation, and inﬂ ation is considered poisonous for proﬁ t. Capitalism, goes 
the conventional wisdom, abhors stagnation and loves price stability. 
Unfortunately, these conventions do not sit well with the facts. Th e mis-
match is largely the result of a theoretical ﬁ xation on ‘material’ accumulation 
measured in absolute terms. If instead we think of accumulation as a diﬀ er-
ential power process, mergers and acquisitions suddenly become as important 
as growth, if not more so, and stagﬂ ation turns from foe to friend. Indeed, as 
we shall see below, these two accumulation paths—amalgamation and stagﬂ a-
tion—have become so paramount that they now appear as broad social ‘regimes,’ 
each with its own unique characteristics. But then we are running ahead of our 
story.
6. mergers and acquisitions
So far, we have argued that diﬀ erential accumulation by dominant capi-
tal—namely, the ability of dominant capital to have its proﬁ t and capitaliza-
tion grow faster than the average—is sustained mainly though merger and 
through stagﬂ ation. Let us now look more closely at the historical evolution 
of each path—beginning with merger in this section and stagﬂ ation in the 
next. Figure 2 shows the long-term progression of corporate amalgamation in 
the United States. Th e bottom series provides an ‘amalgamation index,’ or a 
‘buy-to-build’ ratio. It measures the ratio between the dollar amount put into 
mergers and acquisitions and the dollar amount put into green-ﬁ eld investment. 
According to the data, in 1895, for every $100 of green-ﬁ eld investment in plant 
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and equipment there were roughly 60 cents’ worth of mergers and acquisitions. 
Over the next century, however, this ratio has grown by a multiple of 350 (!), so 
that by 1999, for every $100 of green-ﬁ eld investment there were $215 spent on 
corporate amalgamation (note the log scale).
Th e reason for the exponential increase in this ratio is hardly mysterious. 
Over time, the pace of green-ﬁ eld investment is limited by the overall growth of 
the market. To expand productive capacity faster than the market is to create 
‘glut’ and ensure business ruin. Not so for mergers and acquisitions. Since merg-
ers and acquisitions merely ‘fuse’ existing corporations, they can expand many 
times faster than the market without ever ‘spoiling’ it. And indeed, this is one 
of the main incentives for buying rather than building. By taking over other 
ﬁ rms, capitalists augment their proﬁ t stream and reduce potential competition 
without the risk of  ‘overcapacity’ and falling proﬁ t margins.¹⁵ 
Th e merger process tends to be self-limiting, however. If dominant capital 
buys faster than it builds, sooner or later it is bound to ‘run out’ of takeover 
targets. At that point, the only way for dominant capital to keep merging is 
to ‘break the envelope’ and go beyond its existing corporate universe. Figure 2 
shows this imperative unfolding in the United States. Th e ﬁ rst, ‘monopoly’ 
merger wave, straddling the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries, saw the emergence of big business in the United States and 
the formation of large monopolies in the leading industries. In the second, ‘oli-
gopoly’ wave, which lasted through much of the 1920s, ﬁ rms broke their original 
industry envelope to create vertically integrated ﬁ rms in the various business 
sectors (for instance, oil reﬁ neries expanding upstream to exploration and drill-
ing and downstream to transportation and marketing). Th e third, ‘conglomer-
ate’ wave, building up during the late 1950s and 1960s, saw big ﬁ rms diversifying 
their activity (for example, branching from automobiles to ﬁ nance, to weapons, 
to computers). And the fourth, ‘global’ wave, which occurred during the 1980s 
¹⁵.  Standard analysis often is perplexed by the seemingly  ‘illogical’ drive to merge—
a drive which appears to persist even when takeover targets are  ‘too expensive’ relative to 
green-ﬁ eld investment, and to continue despite  ‘disappointing’ post-merger performance 
(see for example, Brealey et al. : ch. ). Th e problem with this type of analysis is 
that it focuses on the individual ﬁ rm, failing to appreciate the macro consequences of all 
ﬁ rms choosing to build rather than buy. If instead of merger, the funds were ploughed 
back into building new factories, glut and losses would make green-ﬁ eld—not take-
over—look like an expensive mistake (the ﬁ rst to understand this  ‘dilemma’ was Veblen 
; for a critical analysis, see Nitzan and Bichler : ch. ). 
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and 1990s, set in motion the process of creating truly global companies (a shift 
from U.S.-based multinational ﬁ rms to transnational organizations). 
Th is successive breaking of  ‘envelopes’ was not continuous, however. It 
unfolded in waves, and there was a reason for that as well. Merger booms tend 
to ‘hype-up’ investors and make market conditions increasingly fragile as the 
boom progresses. Eventually, negative sentiment sets in, making the market 
inhospitable for merger till the next reversal in mood (Nitzan 1995b, 1996). 
Furthermore, breaking each ‘envelope’ involves major legal, institutional and 
political realignments, and that takes time. Th e consequence is that the whole 
process is susceptible to major interruptions. And since merger is a form of dif-
ferential accumulation, periodic ruptures in the process mean periodic reduc-
tions or even reversals in diﬀ erential accumulation. It is here that stagﬂ ation 
enters the picture. 
7. stagflation¹⁶
‘Neutrality’
To begin with, there seems to be a general neglect, including among radi-
cal political economists, of the historical signiﬁ cance of inﬂ ation for capitalist 
development. On the face of it, this neglect is rather surprising. Inﬂ ation—
commonly deﬁ ned as a general rise in the price of commodities—is hardly new. 
According to David Hacket Fisher (1996), since the thirteenth century there 
have been no less than four major inﬂ ationary waves, or ‘price revolutions’ as he 
calls them. Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of these waves in the U.K., a coun-
try whose price indices go back the farthest. Th e ﬁ rst wave occurred during 
the thirteenth century; the second during the sixteenth century; the third in 
the latter part of the eighteen century; and the most recent one in the twenti-
eth century. Furthermore, each of these price revolutions, Fisher claims, was 
accompanied, particularly toward the latter part of the wave, by a deepening 
socio-economic crisis. In other words, the phenomenon of stagﬂ ation—that is, 
of stagnation together with inﬂ ation—is not new either. Th e term ‘stagﬂ ation’ 
was coined by Paul Samuelson only in the mid-1970s, but the reality of stagﬂ a-
tion goes back many hundreds of years.
Despite its long history and intimate connection to stagnation, political 
economists continue to view inﬂ ation as ‘neutral.’ Following David Hume’s 
¹⁶.  For a fuller theoretical and empirical analysis of inﬂ ation and stagﬂ ation, see 
Nitzan (; ), Bichler and Nitzan (b: ch. ) and Nitzan and Bichler (b; 
: ch. ).
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‘classical dichotomy,’ they insist on distinguishing between the ‘real’ and ‘nomi-
nal’ spheres of economic life. Of these two realms, the ‘real’ sphere of produc-
tion, consumption and distribution is considered primary, whereas the ‘nomi-
nal’ sphere of money and absolute prices is thought of mostly as a lubricant, a 
mechanism that merely facilitates the movement of the ‘real economy.’¹⁷ 
Figure 2 – Corporate Amalgamation in the United States
Source:  Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel (London: 
Pluto Press, 2002), Data Appendix, pp. 82–3. Updated to 2001.
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¹⁷.  Th is view is pervasive. ‘Th ere cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insig-
niﬁ cant thing, in the economy of society, than money,’ tells us John Stuart Mill (: 
Book , ch. ). Money is simply a ‘veil,’ says Irvin Fisher, as does Nobel Laureate Franco 
Modigliani: ‘Money is “neutral”, a “veil” with no consequences for real economic magni-
tudes’ (Papademos and Modigliani : ). And, since, according to Milton Friedman 
(), ‘inﬂ ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon,’ rising prices, 
although a nuisance, are ultimately neutral in the grander scheme of things.
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Now, to be fair to the classical political economists, the backdrop against 
which they were writing was largely one of price stability and even deﬂ ation, 
not inﬂ ation. As shown in Figure 3, U.K. consumer prices had hardly changed 
between 1600 and 1750. In the second half of the eighteenth century, they rose 
relatively quickly, but then fell again throughout the nineteenth century. In that 
context—which by no means was unique to Great Britain—it was only natural 
to concentrate on production and the coercive discipline imposed by ‘market 
forces,’ and to spend less time thinking about the role of inﬂ ation.
However, the historical backdrop changed dramatically during the twenti-
eth century. First, inﬂ ation has risen to unprecedented levels. As Figure 3 shows, 
U.K. prices rose by almost 5,000 percent between 1900 and 2000, compared 
with less than 800 percent in the previous six centuries combined. Second, 
there was a clear change in pattern. During pervious inﬂ ationary waves, prices 
oscillated around their uptrend, but in the twentieth century—with the notable 
exception of the 1930s—they always moved upwards.¹⁸ Th e classical political 
economists, writing in a diﬀ erent era, perhaps could be forgiven for not paying 
too much attention to inﬂ ation. But having lived through the experience of the 
twentieth century, contemporary observers cannot ask for similar leniency.
So why do most economists continue to believe that inﬂ ation is ‘neutral’? 
Th e reason begins with the way they deﬁ ne it. Th ere are two common deﬁ ni-
tions of inﬂ ation: (1) a continuous increase in the average price level; and (2) an 
ongoing increase in ‘liquidity’; that is, an increase in the total amount of money 
relative to the total volume of commodities. Th ese two deﬁ nitions often are seen 
as equivalent: if we derive the average price level P as the ratio between the total 
amount of money M and the overall quantity of commodity Q (ignoring the 
velocity of circulation), it is obvious that in order for P to rise (or fall), the ratio 
M/Q has to rise (or fall) at the same rate, and vice versa. 
Th e crucial thing to note here is the aggregate nature of the deﬁ nition: it 
focuses wholly on averages and totals. Th is fact is important, since to deﬁ ne 
inﬂ ation in this way is to miss the point altogether. Inﬂ ation certainly involves 
a rise in the average price of commodities; but that is like saying that the ‘aver-
age’ outcome of a game between two basketball teams is always a draw: one 
team’s win is another’s loss. Although mathematically correct, the statement 
¹⁸.  Th e story of the s actually is more complicated than it seems. As Gardiner 
Means () showed in his study of the U.S. experience, most of the price drop hap-
pened in competitive industries (where employment and output dropped only moder-
ately), while in the highly concentrated industries prices hardly moved at all (but employ-
ment and output fell dramatically).
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is irrelevant to the reality of basketball games. If these games always ended up 
in a draw, players would soon be looking for another game—one which they 
could actually win. Similarly with inﬂ ation. If all prices rose at the same average 
rate, inﬂ ation deﬁ nitely would be ‘neutral’ as mainstream economists say. But it 
would also serve no purpose whatsoever, and would most likely cease to exist.
Redistribution
Th e crux of inﬂ ation is not that prices rise in general, but that they rise 
diﬀ erentially. Inﬂ ation is never a uniform process. Although most prices tend 
to rise during inﬂ ation, they never all rise at the same rate. Th ere is always a 
spread, with some prices rising faster than the average and others more slowly. 
And since prices change at diﬀ erent rates, we can paraphrase Milton Friedman’s 
famous maxim and state, categorically, that ‘inﬂ ation is always and everywhere 
a redistributional phenomenon.’
Figure 3 – Consumer Prices in the U.K.
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Source: Global Financial Data (series code: CPGBRM); WEFA. 
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Th e diﬀ erence in deﬁ nitions here is crucial. For those who believe that 
inﬂ ation is an aggregate ‘nominal’ process of  ‘too-much-money-chasing-too-
few-commodities,’ indeed there is little reason to look any further into the so-
called ‘real’ world of production and distribution. Th e only relevant questions 
are, ﬁ rst, how much money is created and, second, how increased liquidity is 
‘transmitted’ to higher prices. But if inﬂ ation is merely the aggregate appear-
ance of an underlying distributional struggle, the way to understand it is to 
begin from that very struggle. In this case, the important questions are: who 
gains, who loses, and how?¹⁹
Inﬂ ation redistributes income in many diﬀ erent ways, of which we would 
like to highlight two.²⁰ Th e ﬁ rst is redistribution between workers and capital-
¹⁹.  Note that mainstream economists would readily admit that in reality prices do 
not all change at the same rate, and that relative price variations may even be positively 
correlated with the rate of inﬂ ation (see for instance, Parks ). But these relative vari-
ations, they would add, have little to do with the cause of inﬂ ation, nor do they bear on 
its long term consequences. First, in a competitive market relative price variations reﬂ ect 
changes in consumer preferences (marginal utility) and technology (marginal produc-
tivity), and in that sense have little to do with overall inﬂ ation. Second, ‘disequilibrium’ 
prices—namely, those which do not reﬂ ect the underlying logic of utility and productiv-
ity—may exist, but only temporarily. Soon enough, the market would force them back to 
their ‘proper’ equilibrium levels. And ﬁ nally, during inﬂ ation deviations from equilibrium 
prices arise mostly from misguided expectations and therefore are never systematic in 
their pattern. Th ese deviations could make some ‘agents’ richer and other poorer, but 
only by ﬂ uke. Disequilibrium prices could also arise from ‘government intervention’ and 
‘monopoly practices’ (mainly by labor unions), but the redistributional eﬀ ect is nulliﬁ ed 
once agents become aware of these ‘imperfections’ and ‘discount’ them into their demand 
and supply. Moreover, regardless of their redistributional impact, these ‘imperfection’ 
cannot translate into inﬂ ation unless validated by increases in overall liquidity. 
Unfortunately, this line of defense is persuasive only to those who erect it. First, 
marginal utility and productivity are never observable, so how could we know what is 
the equilibrium price which equates them? Second, equilibrium prices, as their name 
suggests, hold only in equilibrium. But since we never know whether we are in equi-
librium or disequilibrium, how can we know which prices are ‘out of line’? And ﬁ nally, 
why should we assume that inﬂ ation does not systematically redistribute income? To say 
that market forces prevent such systematic redistribution from happening could be an 
explanation for an observed outcome. But should we not ﬁ rst establish that this, indeed, 
is the outcome?
²⁰.  Inﬂ ation is related to the distribution of assets through its impact on relative 
hype and relative risk, as well as through relative proﬁ t—a complicated process that has 
received inadequate attention and whose study is part of our current research project. 
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ists. Figure 4 plots the pattern of this redistribution and the rate of inﬂ ation in 
the United States over the past half-century. Th e rate of inﬂ ation is measured by 
the annual percent change in the wholesale price index. Income distribution is 
presented here as the ratio of s&p 500 earnings per share and the average hourly 
wage in the private sector. Th e speciﬁ c focus on earnings per share and the wage 
rate is intended to emphasize the income of individual owners—the owner of 
capital and the owner of labor power, respectively (both series are smoothed as 
3-year moving averages). 
Now, if mainstream economics is right and inﬂ ation indeed is ‘neutral,’ the 
rate of inﬂ ation should have no systematic correlation with the distribution 
of income between workers and capitalists. But the facts show otherwise. As 
Figure 4 illustrates, there is a fairly tight positive correlation between the two 
processes. Th e correlation is not perfect, of course, but that is to be expected 
given the many factors involved.²¹ For our purposes, the crucial point is the fact 
that such a systematic correlation exists in the ﬁ rst place. Simply put, this cor-
relation tells us that during rising inﬂ ation, corporate proﬁ t has tended to rise 
relative to wages, and vice versa when inﬂ ation has dropped.
Th e second redistribution is between large and small ﬁ rms. Figure 5 plots 
the ratio between the proﬁ t markup of the Fortune 500 and the proﬁ t markup 
of the U.S. business sector as a whole. Th e proﬁ t markup is deﬁ ned here as the 
percent of net proﬁ t in sales. Th e ratio between the two markups, reminiscent of 
Kalecki’s (1943) ‘degree of monopoly,’ indicates the relative ‘proﬁ t power’ of large 
ﬁ rms. In this sense, it provides a proxy for diﬀ erential depth.²² As expected, the 
Fortune 500 enjoy stronger pricing power (over the past half-century, the ratio 
between the markups averaged 1.6). But the crucial points for us here are that 
this relative pricing power has tended to ﬂ uctuate and that the ﬂ uctuations have 
been positively and tightly correlated with the rate of inﬂ ation (as before, inﬂ ation is 
measured by the annual percent change in the wholesale price index, and both 
series in the chart are smoothed as 3-year moving averages). 
²¹.  Th e sharp spike in the ratio of earnings per share to wages during the s 
was probably exaggerated by WorldCom and Enron-like accounting practices. Current 
‘guesstimates’ suggest that throughout that happy decade, legal creativity and plain fraud 
helped overstate U.S. corporate proﬁ ts by  to  percent relative to ‘conventional’ 
accounting standards.
²².  Th is proxy for depth, based on relative proﬁ t shares, is slightly diﬀ erent from 
the one based on relative proﬁ t per employee as deﬁ ned in Section . In , Fortune 
stopped publishing aggregate employment data for its  listing, making the latter proxy 
diﬃ  cult to compute. It should be noted, however, that until , the two measures were 
very tightly correlated.
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Th is positive correlation is rather remarkable, particularly in light of the 
common belief, popular since Means (1935) and Hall and Hitch (1939), that 
large ﬁ rms aim at maintaining a long-term ‘target rate of return,’ and that their 
prices are relatively ‘inﬂ exible’ when compared with those of small ﬁ rms whose 
own markups are set by ‘market conditions.’ Note, however, that this belief was 
substantiated by evidence derived mostly from the ﬁ rst half of the century, and 
particularly from the deﬂ ationary 1930s. Th e second half of the century, though, 
gives a totally diﬀ erent picture. As Figure 5 suggests, since the 1950s, increases 
in U.S. inﬂ ation were associated with—and probably driven by—large ﬁ rms 
Figure 4 – U.S. Inﬂation and Capital-Labor Redistribution*
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actively pushing up their proﬁ t markups faster than smaller ﬁ rms. And the exact 
opposite happened on the way down, with falling inﬂ ation associated with large 
ﬁ rms seeing their markups drop relative to the average. In other words, inﬂ ation 
provided a powerful engine of diﬀ erential accumulation.²³
Figure 5 – U.S. Inﬂation and Diﬀerential Accumulation*
**    The markup is the percent of net proﬁt in sales. The Fortune 500 markup is the percent of 
after tax proﬁt in sales revenues. The business sector markup is computed by dividing total 
corporate proﬁt after tax, with IVA and CCA (from the national income accounts) by total 
business receipts (from the IRS). The  ‘Ratio of Markups’ is giving by dividing the Fortune 500 
markup by the business sector markup.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce through WEFA (series codes: ZAADJ for total 
corporate proﬁt after tax with IVA and CCA; WPINS for the wholesale price index); U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service; Fortune. 
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Clearly, U.S. inﬂ ation has not been ‘neutral’ in the least. On the contrary, it 
has been associated with a systematic redistribution of income from workers to 
ﬁ rms, and from small ﬁ rms to large ﬁ rms. Th at in itself is already a good enough 
reason to doubt conventional inﬂ ation theory. But what is really remarkable 
here is that the direction of these two correlations has remained the same for 
half a century or more. 
Patterns
Redistribution is a matter of power, and power can shift over time. So even 
if we accept that ‘inﬂ ation is always and everywhere a redistributional phenom-
enon,’ there still is no inherent reason to expect it always to work in favor of 
capital in general and in favor of dominant capital in particular. For instance, in 
Israel, much like in the United States, workers tended to lose from inﬂ ation and 
large ﬁ rms tended to gain at the expense of smaller ones (Nitzan and Bichler 
2002: ch. 4). By contrast, in Germany and France, two countries where labor is 
relatively strong, the impact of inﬂ ation on labor/capital redistribution has been 
far less clear (the highly aggregated nature of OECD data makes it diﬃ  cult to 
draw conclusions regarding the performance of large versus small ﬁ rms). 
Evidently, then, the link between inﬂ ation and redistribution has no preset 
pattern. Inﬂ ation itself is a tricky process; its consequences in the cases exam-
ined here depend on the power of dominant capital vis-à-vis labor and relative 
to capital in general—neither of which can be determined a priori; and the dis-
tributional outcome can change over time. In this light, the fact that the U.S. 
experience has been so systematic in one direction is highly signiﬁ cant. 
Th e implication of this systematic pattern is that, in the United States (as 
well as in other countries with a similar pattern), inﬂ ation has become a very 
potent—and fairly ‘reliable’—engine of diﬀ erential accumulation. With a long 
history to learn from, companies know that inﬂ ation helps them raise their 
proﬁ t faster than it helps workers raise their wages. Th ey know that it helps 
them more if they are large than if they are small. And they know that there is a 
certain regularity to the process. In short, they know more or less what to expect. 
Accumulation Through Crisis
But, then, if all of these claims are true, why does dominant capital not 
support indeﬁ nite inﬂ ation? Th e basic reason is that inﬂ ation, although usually 
eﬀ ective in generating diﬀ erential accumulation, is also socially destabilizing 
²³.  For similar evidence and analysis of the relationship between inﬂ ation and diﬀ er-
ential accumulation in Israel and South Africa, see Nitzan and Bichler (b; ).
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and often diﬃ  cult to manage and contain, and therefore causes capitalists to 
perceive the world around them as more ‘risky.’²⁴
As we claimed earlier in the paper, over the long run inﬂ ation tends to 
coincide with stagnating production and high unemployment. Th is claim is 
certainly unconventional. Indeed, the facts notwithstanding, most economists 
would probably reject it outright. As a monetary phenomenon, they would 
counter-argue, inﬂ ation can have no lasting impact on the ‘real’ world. Th ey 
would concede that inﬂ ation could be triggered by ‘real’ variables—but certainly 
not by stagnation. To the contrary, the popular macroeconomic canon stipu-
lates that inﬂ ation is triggered by growth and that it decreases with recession. 
Unfortunately, here too the facts refuse to obey the theory. Figure 6 shows 
the long-term relationship between inﬂ ation and economic growth in the 
United States, going back to 1890 (with the series smoothed as 20-year moving 
averages). Th e data show quite clearly that the relationship between the two 
phenomena is not positive, but negative. Low inﬂ ation is associated with high 
growth, whereas high inﬂ ation is commonly accompanied by stagnation—the 
exact opposite of what conventional theory wants us to believe. Inﬂ ation tends to 
appear as stagﬂ ation. And this ‘perverted’ relationship is hardly limited to the 
United States. In fact, during the postwar period the long-term negative corre-
lation between growth and inﬂ ation has become the rule rather than the excep-
tion, reproducing itself in country after country, developed as well as developing 
(see for example, Nitzan 1995a; Nitzan and Bichler 2002: Figure 2.8, p. 71). 
Why do these facts diﬀ er so dramatically from popular convention and 
economic theory? Th e reason has much to do with the timeframe. Th e argu-
ment that rapid growth triggers inﬂ ation can make sense only in the very short 
term and under the very stringent assumption that capacity is already fully uti-
lized and cannot be immediately expanded to meet runaway demand. 
Th is latter situation, however, is both rare and transitory. First, under so-
called ‘normal’ conditions, physical capacity is never fully utilized. To illustrate, 
over the past century the average rate of unemployment in the United States 
has stood at 7 percent, and that excludes the categories of part-timers and the 
underemployed (not to mention those who choose not to work, are discouraged, 
or are incarcerated, and therefore considered ‘not in the labor force’). Various 
estimates of the utilization of actual capacity range from 25 percent to 50 per-
²⁴.  Insofar as the perceived increase in ‘risk’ exceeds the increase in expected income, 
the net eﬀ ect of inﬂ ation will be lower asset prices. Th e impact on relative asset prices, 
however, is far more complicated (see footnote ).
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cent.²⁵ Second, as overall growth continues, green-ﬁ eld investment and capacity 
tend to rise even faster, causing ‘bottlenecks’ to give way to ‘glut.’²⁶
Th e question, though, is, why, in the absence of any real ‘shortage,’ are 
buyers willing to pay higher prices? Th e short answer is that usually they are not 
willing; they are forced. And the way to force them is by creating, imposing and 
maintaining various forms of social crisis, apparent or real. Military hostilities 
during the First World War, the reparation crisis of Germany in the 1920s, the 
global oil crises of the 1970s, rising unemployment in Israel during the 1980s, 
political instability in Russia circa 1990s, debt default in Argentina in the 2000s 
are all illustrations of such inﬂ ation-triggering crises. Th e eﬀ ect of these crises 
on inﬂ ation is twofold. On the one hand, they undermine the power of most 
people to resist price increases. On the other hand, they enable a ‘consensus’ 
to emerge within dominant capital that inﬂ ation can be used with ‘impunity.’ 
In this sense, stagﬂ ation is the macroeconomic appearance of  ‘accumulation 
through crisis.’ Stagnation and unemployment, along with other forms of 
instability, conﬂ ict and force, constitute the necessary backdrop for diﬀ erential 
accumulation through diﬀ erential inﬂ ation. 
But the process is highly perilous. More inﬂ ation usually requires a more 
intense crisis and therefore implies mounting hazards. Th ose who lose from 
inﬂ ation begin to oppose it, and even if they fail to stop it, instability heightens. 
And, so, although the potential gains from inﬂ ation are huge, they are commen-
surate with the risks—risks to diﬀ erential accumulation speciﬁ cally, and risks 
to the hegemony of capital more generally. From the viewpoint of dominant 
capital, therefore, inﬂ ation is forever a double-edged sword. Eﬀ ective but highly 
²⁵.  Conventional capacity measures consider what is feasible under the existing social 
order of business enterprise and production for proﬁ t, and they usually estimate normal 
utilization to be in the  to  percent range. Alternative measures based on a mate-
rial/technological limit, however, suggest a far lower utilization of capacity. At the turn 
of the twentieth century, Veblen (: ) put the actual rate of utilization at less than 
 percent, a ﬁ gure not much diﬀ erent from later estimates reported in Blair (: ) 
and Foster (: ch. ). Interestingly, though not surprisingly, U.S. military contractors, 
engaged in the most destructive form of business enterprise, sometimes operate at as 
little as  percent of their ‘capacity’ (U.S. Congress : ).
²⁶.  To illustrate, think of East Asia during the s, where annual growth rates 
of  to  percent were associated with falling export prices. Was there anything mysteri-
ous behind this combination of growth and deﬂ ation? Hardly. Despite the rapid growth 
(or rather because of that growth), the investment-to-GDP ratio kept rising, while East 
Asian companies kept undercutting each other in a hyper-competitive trench war. It is no 
wonder that their prices kept falling.
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dangerous, it is not the weapon of ﬁ rst choice. It tends to emerge only when 
there is ‘no alternative.’
8. the new arsenal
To recap, the twentieth century fundamentally altered the nature of accu-
mulation. Th e emergence of big government and big business gave rise to a 
new consolidation, ‘dominant capital.’ Th e new institution of incorporation, 
which for Marx signaled the ‘abolition of capital as private property within 
the framework of capitalist production itself,’ along with the rise of big govern-
ment, helped create massive power coalitions that further intertwined business 
Figure 6 – United States: Long Term Inﬂation and Growth*
Source: Historical data till 1928 are from Bank Credit Analyst Research Group. From 1929 
onward, data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce through WEFA (series codes: GDP 
for GDP; GDP96 for GDP in constant prices).
*      Series are shown as 20-year moving averages. The smooth curve running through the 
observations is drawn freehand for illustration purposes.
**    Ratio of GDP in current prices to GDP in constant prices.
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owners and state organs. In parallel, the ‘larger use of credit,’ whose signiﬁ cance 
was ﬁ rst studied by Th orstein Veblen, gave capital the inﬁ nitely malleable form 
of ﬁ nance.
Accumulation in the nineteenth century was thought of—certainly by 
theorists—largely in absolute terms. As such, it depended on economic growth 
and relative price stability; it was led by imperial conquest; and it was backed 
by a gold standard. In the twentieth century, and particularly after the Second 
Word War, the emphasis shifted toward diﬀ erential performance. Furthermore, 
the arsenal of accumulation expanded to incorporate two brand new tech-
niques—corporate amalgamation and stagﬂ ation.
Th us, instead of economic growth, dominant capital resorted more and 
more to corporate merger, and in lieu of geographic conquest it relied increas-
ingly on foreign investment and the spread of business ideology and standard-
ized accounting. Th e use of force in accumulation was not abandoned, of course, 
although it was greatly reﬁ ned. Whereas previously force was often used for 
straightforward ‘material’ conﬁ scation, now it was utilized in a more round-
about way. Instability, conﬂ ict and stagnation were now denounced as being 
‘bad for accumulation.’ But behind the façade, they enabled a stealthy process of 
accumulation through inﬂ ation. Th e gold standard, incompatible with this new 
accumulation technique, was doomed. Sooner or later it had to give way to the 
more ﬂ exible power of purely ﬁ at money and unbounded credit. And indeed, 
diﬀ erential inﬂ ation, invisibly mediated through stagnation and crisis, brought 
a surprisingly ‘orderly’ redistribution of income from workers to owners and 
from small ﬁ rms to dominant capital. 
Historically, the new accumulation arsenal of amalgamation and stagﬂ a-
tion worked with increasing precision and surprising regularity. Figure 7 illus-
trates the evolution of this pattern in the United States (with series smoothed 
as 5-year moving averages). Th e bottom series in the chart is our amalgama-
tion index, measuring the buy-to-build ratio introduced in Figure 2. Th e top 
series provides a ‘stagﬂ ation index.’ Th e construction of this index is relatively 
straightforward. We begin with two basic series: the annual rate of unemploy-
ment, which is a proxy for stagnation, and the annual rate of change of the 
Implicit GDP Deﬂ ator, which is a proxy for inﬂ ation. We then express each of 
these series in terms of standard deviations from its own historical average (for 
1890–2001), add up the two standardized series and divide the sum by two.
Now note that, over the past century, the United States has always had 
some unemployment (read stagnation), along with a positive rate of inﬂ ation 
(with the exception of the Great Depression, when diﬀ erential inﬂ ation was 
hidden by aggregate deﬂ ation; see footnote 18 above). With the exception of the 
1930s, then, the entire period was one of stagﬂ ation. Th e purpose of the stagﬂ ation 
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index is to describe the changing ‘intensity’ of that process. An index reading 
of zero represents the average, or ‘normal’ intensity of stagﬂ ation over the past 
century. A positive reading for the index means a combination of above aver-
age stagnation and/or inﬂ ation; that is, above average stagﬂ ation. Similarly, a 
Figure 7 – Amalgamation and Stagﬂation in the United States*
*     Series are shown as 5-year moving averages (the ﬁrst four observations in each series cover 
data to that point only).
Source: The stagﬂation index is computed from data from the U.S. Department of Commerce 
through WEFA (series codes: RUC for the rate of unemployment and GDP/GDP96 for the GDP 
implicit price deﬂator). The Amalgamation Index is from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon 
Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel (London: Pluto Press, 2002), Data Appendix, 
pp. 82–3 (updated to 2001).
**   Computed as the average of: (1) the standardized deviations from average of the rate of 
unemployment, and (2) the standardized deviations from the average rate of inﬂation of the 
GDP implicit price deﬂator.
***  Mergers and acquisitions as a percent of gross ﬁxed capital formation.
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negative reading on the index means a combination of below average stagnation 
and/or inﬂ ation; namely, below average stagﬂ ation. 
Of the two diﬀ erential accumulation weapons—merger and stagﬂ ation—
the former has proven more eﬀ ective and less risky. As we have already seen 
in Figure 2, the ratio of merger to green-ﬁ eld investment has risen exponen-
tially over the past century. And since corporate amalgamation, almost by deﬁ -
nition, contributes to diﬀ erential accumulation, it is no surprise that merger 
and takeover were enthusiastically endorsed by dominant capital, government 
organs and academic ideologues—all in the name of productive ‘eﬃ  ciency’ and 
national ‘competitiveness.’
A merger boom is largely incompatible with stagﬂ ation. Corporate take-
over thrives on investors’ hype and an open takeover pool, which in turn require 
some measure of growth, proletarianization, capital mobility and relative politi-
cal stability—the exact opposite of the crisis atmosphere needed for inﬂ ation. 
In other words, diﬀ erential breadth through corporate amalgamation and dif-
ferential depth via stagﬂ ation are contradictory paths, each depending on an 
opposite set of social circumstances. In this sense, we can treat each path as 
a distinct ‘regime’ of diﬀ erential accumulation. Of these two regimes, merger 
is the path of least resistance, and when it prevails, stagﬂ ation is likely to be 
dormant. But as noted in Section 6, amalgamation is sometimes diﬃ  cult, and 
when its pace declines, the door opens for the crisis-ridden but highly eﬀ ective 
path of stagﬂ ation. 
It is crucial to emphasize, again, that our argument here is neither ‘econ-
omistic’ nor ‘deterministic.’ Diﬀ erential accumulation is not about ‘economics.’ 
It is about power and opposition to power. Th e symbolic form of this power 
is ﬁ nancial, but its content is political in the broadest sense of the term. Dif-
ferential accumulation is evidence—certainly in the mind of accumulators—of 
growing social power. Indeed, without power, there could be no diﬀ erential 
accumulation. Th is emphasis on power and resistance to power also suggests, 
and here we come to the issue of determinism, that the process does not have to 
follow a preset pattern—or any pattern for that matter. Simply put, diﬀ erential 
accumulation does not have to happen. It will happen if there are mergers. It will 
probably happen if there is stagﬂ ation. But mergers and stagﬂ ation themselves 
do not have to happen. Dominant capital may seek mergers or stagﬂ ation, but 
it could fail to achieve them—fail because of opposition, inner conﬂ icts, or its 
own incompetence. And if neither merger nor stagﬂ ation prevails, the likely 
result is diﬀ erential decumulation. 
In this light, the stylized pattern evident in Figure 7 is remarkable, to say 
the least. Th e chart shows the amalgamation and stagﬂ ation cycles moving 
almost as mirror images of each another. And what is more, the negative cor-
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relation between them seems to have grown tighter over time.²⁷ Given that 
both regimes serve to boost diﬀ erential accumulation, it is clear that, de facto, 
dominant capital has been increasingly eﬀ ective in securing its power. But none 
of this was ‘automatic.’ Th e power of dominant capital is conscientiously con-
structed against opposition. It is replete with conﬂ ict and besieged by contra-
dictions. It can fail. 
9. deflation
Th e conjectural nature of the process is all too clear at the present moment, 
as is illustrated by the last few data points in Figure 7. In 2000, corporate amal-
gamation collapsed, bringing the twenty-year global merger wave to an end (see 
also Figure 2). In parallel, the long downtrend in stagﬂ ation seems to have bot-
tomed out. 
Th is apparent swing of the pendulum—should it materialize—has been 
long in coming (and indeed predicted—see for instance Nitzan 1999; 2001). 
Over the past twenty years, the prolonged process of breadth expansion, par-
ticularly the opening up for business and green-ﬁ eld investment of  ‘emerging 
markets’ in Asia, Latin America and the former Eastern Block, has created 
a massive global glut. Although mergers worked to contain these centrifugal 
forces to some extent, they could not stop them. And as a result, the intensity of 
stagﬂ ation declined more or less continuously since the mid-1980s, and in 2001 
reached its lowest level in 70 years, according to Figure 7.
By the end of the twentieth century, corporate ‘pricing power’ had weak-
ened to its lowest point since the Great Depression. CPI inﬂ ation in the indus-
trialized countries declined throughout much of the 1980s, reaching 1 percent in 
1999—its lowest since the 1950s (see Figure 10 below). Similarly, in 2000, with 
the ‘new economy’ hype having been punctured, corporate earnings—both 
globally and in the U.S.—took a nose-dive, showing their steepest drop since 
the 1930s. 
Clearly, the current situation is not the best for dominant capital. Indeed, 
with mergers having entered a deep freeze and unlikely to revive any time soon, 
and with pricing power in the doldrums, there is a real threat of diﬀ erential 
decumulation taking hold. 
²⁷.  Th e -year moving correlation between the stagﬂ ation and amalgamation indi-
ces (with the amalgamation index measured as natural log and expressed as deviation 
from its own trend) rose from a +. in , to –. in .
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The Risk
Th e negative sentiment is most vividly captured by the sudden reappear-
ance of a new-old threat: deﬂ ation. For much of the postwar era, the policy and 
academic rhetoric was focused almost exclusively on inﬂ ation. Th is preoccupa-
tion began in the early 1940s. Within a few years after the Great Depression, 
deﬂ ation had already become a distant memory. John Maynard Keynes, who 
had just published the seminal text on how to ﬁ ght unemployment, quickly 
shifted his attention to the threat of rising prices. His subsequent book, aptly 
titled How to Pay for the War (1940), set the tone. From then on, the goal was to 
stop inﬂ ation. Forty years later, theorists and central bankers ﬁ nally saw light at 
the end of the tunnel: in the 1980s, inﬂ ation began to ease. Th e rhetoric, though, 
had not changed much. Th e experts became less fearful of the (neutral) beast, 
and there was a lot of self-congratulating analysis for winning the anti-inﬂ ation 
Figure 8 – The Threat of Deﬂation
*     January-April.
Source: Business Source Premier.
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‘battle.’ But the discourse was always qualiﬁ ed by a call for vigilance. Th e mon-
ster was indeed caged, but it could always escape. When it came to inﬂ ation, you 
could not be overly cautious.
And then, suddenly, the tone changed. Th e reversal is starkly illustrated 
in Figure 8. Th e data in the chart are derived from a text search of EBSCO’s 
Business Source Premier, a database covering more than 2,800 scholarly business 
journals in English. For every year since 1980, we counted the number of articles 
that contained the word ‘deﬂ ation’ and the number of articles that contained 
the word ‘inﬂ ation,’ and we computed the ratio between them. 
Th e result points to 1998 as a clear watershed. Till then deﬂ ation was not 
even on the radar screen: the ratio of deﬂ ation-to-inﬂ ation articles averaged 2.5 
percent and rarely exceeded 3 percent. But in 1998, with fear of glut ﬁ nally trig-
gering the Asian Crisis, and with ‘contagion’ beginning to infect the major stock 
markets, concern for deﬂ ation skyrocketed and the index jumped more than 
fourfold, to over 10 percent. Initially, the unfolding high-tech mania helped 
camouﬂ age the problem, making the 1998 episode look like false alarm. But the 
high-tech mania was coming at the cusp of the long breadth regime of corporate 
mergers. And when, in the early 2000s, the ﬂ oor ﬁ nally fell out and the stock 
market collapsed, the deﬂ ation-to-inﬂ ation index jumped to nearly 8 percent in 
2001, rising further to 12 in 2002, and to 16 percent in the ﬁ rst four months of 
2003. Th e ghost of deﬂ ation came back with a vengeance.
Th e current fear of deﬂ ation is not unfounded. Falling prices obviously are 
a threat to diﬀ erential accumulation. With mergers stuck in neutral, dominant 
capital now needs to kick-start inﬂ ation, not combat deﬂ ation. But the prob-
lem runs much deeper. Over the past half-century, and particularly since the 
early 1980s, debt loads measured relative to GDP have soared to unprecedented 
levels.²⁸ Th e increase in debt has taken place in the context of continuously 
rising prices, which, by inﬂ ating nominal GDP, have worked to partly mitigate 
the rising debt burden. Th is mechanism of lessening the debt load no longer 
works if prices stabilize; and it goes into reverse if prices start falling. Indeed, 
under the latter circumstances, central bankers may ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to lower 
²⁸.  Th e increase in debt loads reﬂ ects a combination of several factors, including 
rising ‘multiple counting’ of chained obligations, fresh capitalization of previously non-
capitalized incomes, increases in expected future income, a willingness to accept a lower 
‘normal rate of return,’  and, paradoxically, a drop in perceptions of risk. Th e overall extent 
of the surge in the debt-to-GDP ratio is probably understated by the explosive growth 
over the past twenty years of  ‘oﬀ -balance sheet’ obligations.
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‘real’ interest rates (since depositors generally refuse to accept negative nominal 
rates); overextended debtors may become unable to service their debt; and some 
of these debtors may be forced into bankruptcy. If the process unfolds into a 
chain reaction, it could conceivably lead to a runaway debt deﬂ ation, not unlike 
the one experienced during the 1930s.²⁹
As illustrated in Figure 9, the magnitude of this threat is serious, to put 
it mildly. Th e chart shows, for the period of 1919 to 2002, the value of U.S. 
total credit market debt expressed as a percent of GDP. It also depicts, for both 
developed and developing countries since the early 1960s, the growth of total 
credit to the private sector relative to GDP. 
All three series suggest that debtors have become extremely leveraged. In 
the United States, the current debt load is nearly twice as high as it was in 1929, 
on the eve of the Great Depression. As the Great Depression unfolded, falling 
nominal GDP caused the debt-to-GDP ratio to soar to over 270 percent. A 
comparable decline in nominal GDP today would push the debt-to-GDP ratio 
to over 400 percent. Th e data for the broader aggregate of countries cover only 
the private sector, but it is obvious that here, too, there is extreme stress. In the 
developed countries, the ratio of private credit to GDP is three times what it 
was in the early 1960s, whereas in the developing countries it is nearly four times 
as high.
The ‘Solution’
Th ere are two basic ‘solutions’ to this threatening ‘imbalance.’ One is to 
cut the amount of outstanding debt through default (debt forgiveness being 
a non-option). Th e other is to increase nominal GDP through price inﬂ ation, 
while keeping ‘real’ interest rates relatively stable (‘real’ GDP growth being too 
slow for this purpose). Most practical economists consider the ﬁ rst solution far 
too painful to contemplate, so their preference naturally gravitates toward the 
second.
 ‘Ignore the Ghost of Deﬂ ation,’ recommends Financial Times columnist 
Samuel Britton. ‘Apart from Japan,’ he observed, ‘the world has not seen deﬂ a-
tion for 70 years’ (as if the world’s second largest economy can be treated as 
an anomaly, and ‘70 years’ as a magic threshold beyond which deﬂ ation can 
²⁹.  Th e ﬁ rst to analyze the process of debt deﬂ ation in some detail was the American 
economist Irving Fisher (). Fisher wrote his analysis after the  Crash wiped out 
much of his own fortune of  million (over  million in today’s prices), a fortune 
which he invested under the sound assumption that money was ‘neutral’ and that debt 
loads did not matter.
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never return). ‘Deﬂ ation is an overblown worry,’ declares James Grant, editor 
of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer. ‘Believe in Ghosts, Goblins, Wizards and 
Witches if you will,’ concurs ﬁ nancial expert Adrian Douglas, ‘but don’t believe 
in deﬂ ation occurring any time soon.’ Th ere is little to worry about, says Fed 
Chairman Alan Greenspan: ‘Th e United States is nowhere close to sliding into 
a pernicious deﬂ ation.’³⁰ 
Of course, denying the problem does not solve it. And, so, for those who 
remain fearful, the experts promise that whatever the risk, it could easily be 
defused. ‘Th e good news,’ announces former member of the Federal Reserve 
Board, Angell Wayne, ‘is that monetary policy never runs out of power.’ ‘Th ere’s 
Figure 9 – The Debt Load 
Source:  Bank Credit Analyst Research Group; World Development Indicators.
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a much exaggerated concern about deﬂ ation,’ laments Nobel Laureate Milton 
Friedman. ‘It’s not a serious prospect. Inﬂ ation is still a much more serious prob-
lem than deﬂ ation. Today’s Federal Reserve is not going to repeat the mistakes 
of the Federal Reserve of the 1930s. Th e cure for deﬂ ation is very simple. Print 
money.’ Th e same assumption underlies the soothing speech by Fed Governor 
Ben Bernanke, given in 2002 to the National Economist Club. In his address, 
properly titled ‘Deﬂ ation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here,’ Bernanke 
explained that ‘Deﬂ ation is always reversible under a ﬁ at money system.’ ‘Th e 
U.S. government,’ he assured his audience, ‘has a technology called the printing 
press that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no 
cost’ (Bernanke 2002).
Unfortunately, the matter is not that simple. Th e central bank can certainly 
print as much ‘high-powered money’ as it wants. But that act in itself does not 
necessarily mean higher prices, nor does it defuse the concerns of creditors. 
On its own, it is like ‘pushing on a string,’ as Keynes would have put it. For 
loose monetary policy to ‘translate’ into inﬂ ation you need to have individual 
companies and workers actually raise their prices—and that may or many not 
happen. Japan after its 1989 market crash is a case in point: interest rates have 
fallen to zero and money has been made practically free—and yet deﬂ ation, not 
inﬂ ation, has prevailed. Alternatively, and as pointed out correctly by Robert 
Prechter (2003), simply opening the monetary ﬂ ood gates when debt loads are 
extremely high could easily create panic, leading to distress selling among bond 
holders and loan calling by creditors. Th e result of this scenario is to trigger the 
very debt deﬂ ation that policy loosening was meant to prevent. 
10. the oil factor
Differential Profits and the Inflation Outlook
Inﬂ ation cannot be ‘kick-started’ simply by having central banks print 
money. As we said, it has to start by having ﬁ rms and/or workers charge higher 
prices for the goods and services they sell. Now, unlike corporate mergers, which 
individual ﬁ rms can pursue more or less unilaterally, no single corporation can 
start inﬂ ation ‘on its own.’ Raising your prices when no one else does is busi-
ness suicide. A similar limitation restricts workers’ wage demands, especially 
in a global context where production can be relocated easily. For prices to start 
rising, particularly after a long period of relative stability and under conditions 
of perceived ‘glut,’ the stronger groups in society must share a common outlook 
that inﬂ ation is indeed coming. And this collective outlook is most likely to 
emerge when these dominant groups feel that inﬂ ation is not only ‘inevitable,’ 
but also in their diﬀ erential interest.
Dominant Capital and the New Wars 297
In this sense, rising inﬂ ation is not very diﬀ erent from an investment-led 
boom. Th ere is little to prevent any individual ﬁ rm from building new capacity. 
But for ﬁ rms to actually go ahead and build new factories, they need to believe 
that this new capacity will increase proﬁ t in the future; and that belief is most 
likely to trigger action when it is commonly shared. In other words, it is only 
when many ﬁ rms begin to view green-ﬁ eld investment favorably that individual 
companies begin to spend money on new plant and equipment.³¹ Once the pro-
cess is set in motion, increases in production, income and spending make these 
proﬁ t expectations self-fulﬁ lling, but the initial spark usually requires a change 
in the broad outlook of companies. 
A similar process unfolds when inﬂ ation begins to accelerate. As more and 
more ﬁ rms start raising prices, and as income begins to be redistributed from 
workers to ﬁ rms (Figure 4) and from smaller ﬁ rms to larger ones (Figure 5), 
expectations for diﬀ erential inﬂ ationary proﬁ ts are ‘validated,’ leading to even 
more price hikes. But like with investment, here, too, in order for the process to 
begin, there needs to be a common expectation, a shared view among the domi-
nant groups in society that inﬂ ation will boost their diﬀ erential proﬁ t.
Note our emphasis here on proﬁ t expectations rather than price expectations. 
Th e diﬀ erence is crucial. In mainstream economic theory, according to which 
everyone is powerless, price expectations can only be part of a passive mechanism 
in which ‘agents’ simply react to expected changes, their sole purpose being to 
sustain their existing equilibrium income. In the context of diﬀ erential power, 
however, proﬁ t expectations become part of an active strategy to enhance one’s 
relative position.
But ﬁ rst there must be the initial change in diﬀ erential proﬁ t expectations, 
and, as these lines are being written (early 2003), it seems that this change may 
have begun. Dominant capital already feels its back pressed against the wall. As 
we have seen, merger activity has dried up and deﬂ ation increasingly is viewed 
as a threat. Th ere is now a yearning among large ﬁ rms for some ‘pricing power,’ 
even at the cost of stagﬂ ation and social instability. ‘Greenspan must go for 
higher inﬂ ation,’ insist Bill Dudley of Goldman Sacks and Paul McCulley of 
Pimco in a recent Financial Times article. ‘Inﬂ ation is too low, rather than too 
high,’ they warn, and ‘the Fed should welcome a modest rise in inﬂ ation’ (Dudley 
³¹.  Note the fundamental diﬀ erence between boosting current production to meet 
current increases in sales and building new factories whose proﬁ tability will depend on 
conditions that will prevail a few years down the road. In the ﬁ rst case, the impact on 
proﬁ t is nearly certain, in the latter highly conjectural.
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and McCulley 2003). And it is not as if the Fed has not been trying. Over the 
past two years Alan Greenspan has cut interest rates to levels last seen in the 
happy 1960s, making money cheaper and cheaper. Fear of deﬂ ation is ﬁ nally 
creeping into the Fed’s own statements. In a recent announcement, Greenspan 
warned of  ‘unwelcome substantial fall in inﬂ ation’ (Press Release, May 6, 2003). 
Th at is probably the ﬁ rst time since the Great Depression that the U.S. central 
bank has said that lower inﬂ ation is ‘unwelcome.’ And a few days later, Treasury 
Secretary John Snow extended another invitation for inﬂ ation when he sug-
gested that his government would abandon its eight-year ‘strong-dollar policy.’³² 
Clearly, the circumstances have become ripe for a regime change. Th e only thing 
missing is a ‘spark.’
Inflation and the Price of Oil
In principle, many events could trigger a change in the collective mindset 
of dominant capital. A declaration of war, a sudden devaluation, massive riots, 
etc., could each do the trick. Over the past quarter-century, however, the most 
eﬀ ective inﬂ ation spark, undoubtedly, has been a rise in the price of oil.
Th e statistical correlation between oil prices and overall inﬂ ation is illus-
trated in Figure 10. Th e thick line shows the annual CPI inﬂ ation in the indus-
trialized countries (measured as the percent rate of change between the same 
months in successive years). Th e thin line denotes the so-called ‘real’ price of 
oil, denominated in 2002 U.S. dollars (computed as the dollar price of crude 
oil divided by the U.S. CPI). A rise in the ‘real’ price of oil means that the U.S. 
dollar price of oil increased faster (or fell more slowly) than the U.S. consumer 
price index, and vice versa when the ‘real’ price of oil dropped. As the chart 
shows, until the early 1970s the ‘real’ price of oil had little relationship with 
inﬂ ation. From the mid-1970s onward, however, oil clearly became a ‘leading 
indicator’ for inﬂ ation. It ‘led’ inﬂ ation on the way up, it ‘led’ it on the way 
down, and, apparently, it still leads it today.
Note that we emphasize here oil prices as a ‘leading indicator’ rather than 
a ‘direct cause’ of inﬂ ation. Th e relationship between oil prices and inﬂ ation is 
³².  Incidentally, this announcement ﬂ ies in the face of suggestions that the U.S. attack 
on Iraq was partly motivated by a desire to  ‘defend’ the dollar. According to that argument, 
OPEC was allegedly planning to denominate its business in Euros instead of dollars, a 
move which would have weakened the dollar; hence the U.S. conquest of Iraq to prevent 
that switch from happening. Snow’s announcement puts a big dent in this thesis. 
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only partly anchored in the role of oil as a key production input.³³ Th e more 
important reason for the correlation is that the leading capitalist groups tend to 
view the price of oil as a ‘barometer’ of future inﬂ ation and adjust their overall 
pricing strategies in line with its ﬂ uctuations.³⁴
In 1999, when falling crude oil prices approached $10 a barrel, Th e Econo-
mist of London conﬁ dently predicted further declines. ‘Th e world is awash with 
oil,’ it stated, ‘and it is likely to remain so’ (Anonymous 1999a). In that same year, 
the more cautious U.S. Energy Information Administration predicted that oil 
prices would rise by a modest 2.5 percent annually for the next seven years.³⁵ 
With the breadth regime seemingly in full swing, happy scenarios of this type 
seemed perfectly plausible. Dominant capital was busy taking over other ﬁ rms 
and hyping up its high-tech assets. It wanted to hear nothing of oil shocks and 
inﬂ ation. 
But the world was changing rapidly. In 2001, diﬀ erential breadth came 
crashing down. Dominant capital, which till then had insisted on neoliberal 
‘sound ﬁ nance,’ suddenly became thirsty for depth-driven inﬂ ation. And then, 
with little warning and in open deﬁ ance of both ‘market forces’ and the experts, 
the price of oil tripled. As before, consumer prices followed suit. Yet, as Figure 10 
shows, so far the increase in consumer prices remained muted. 
³³.  Over the past twenty years, the role of crude oil as a key input has declined 
dramatically. Energy eﬃ  ciency has doubled, while the ‘real’ price of oil has fallen by 
almost two thirds. As a result, the dollar value of oil produced in  accounted for 
only . percent of world GDP, compared to . percent in . And yet, despite this 
massive decline in the input role of oil, the relationship between oil prices and inﬂ ation 
has remained practically unchanged (ﬁ gures computed from British Petroleum Annual; 
World Bank Annual). 
³⁴.  In fact, the greater the extent to which higher oil prices are ‘passed on’ to ﬁ nal 
prices, the less the correlation should be between the ‘real’ price of oil and the rate of 
inﬂ ation. Th is situation seems to have prevailed until the early s: the nominal price 
of oil rose; overall prices increased at roughly the same rate; and, as a consequence, the 
‘real’ price of oil remained more or less ﬂ at. From the early s onward, however, the 
‘real’ price of oil became positively correlated with inﬂ ation, which means that changes in 
oil prices were only partly ‘passed on’ to consumer prices. It is clear, then, that the post-
 mechanism was neither ‘automatic’ nor ‘neutral.’ It involved redistribution in favor 
of owners of oil when oil prices rose and redistribution in favor of owners of other com-
modities when the price of oil fell. 
³⁵.  Computed as the compounded annual growth rate which would make the EIA 
 benchmark price rise from its actual average of . in  to its forecast level of 
. in . http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/pdf/table.pdf 
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Th at dominant capital has an interest in higher inﬂ ation right now seems 
beyond doubt. In the absence of inﬂ ation, it faces the dual risk of debt deﬂ a-
tion and diﬀ erential decumulation. Th e way out of this predicament is a change 
in diﬀ erential accumulation regime—from breadth through merger to depth 
through stagﬂ ation. And the most likely trigger for the shift is a signiﬁ cant—
and suﬃ  ciently persistent—increase in the price of oil. 
Th is last requirement is worth elaborating. Dominant capital presently has 
an interest in inﬂ ation, but judging by its hesitant response to the recent oil 
price hikes, it is not yet sure that such inﬂ ation is coming. In order for the col-
lective mindset of dominant capital to decisively shift toward depth and inﬂ a-
tionary proﬁ t, the ‘oil spark’ probably needs to be both stronger and longer. And 
that strong and long spark requires agency. 
Figure 10 – Inﬂation and the Price of Oil
Source:  International Financial Statistics through WEFA (series codes: L64@C110 for 
CPI in the industrialized countries; L76AA&Z@C001 for the price of crude oil; 
L64@C111 for the U.S. CPI).
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To reiterate, there is nothing ‘inevitable’ about this chain of events. As we 
said, diﬀ erential accumulation may or may not happen. Likewise, there is no 
historical ‘law of motion’ dictating a timely shift from breadth to depth. Th e 
social and political changes involved in bringing about such a shift are huge, as 
are the consequences. Furthermore, the processes are both highly complicated 
and subject to multiple forms of opposition which may or may not be over-
come. But to overcome that opposition will probably require a dose of purposeful 
human action. 
Diﬀ erential accumulation is the ﬁ nancial form of increasing capitalist power. 
It cannot happen without such power. And power has no meaning in the absence 
of free will: the freedom to exert it or not to exert it; the freedom to chose its 
particular form; and, of course, the freedom to oppose it by those on whom it is 
imposed. If everyone were an automaton in the grand ‘structure’ of capitalism, 
there would be no capitalism. Th e ‘structure,’ or ‘logic’ of capitalism is articu-
lated primarily by those who dominate it. Th ose who dominate it are those who 
proﬁ t the most. And those who proﬁ t the most often are those who experience 
the fastest diﬀ erential accumulation. If we look for purposeful action in the 
current historical conjunction, they are the ones we should start with.
11. the weapondollar-petrodollar coalition³⁶
Th e groups that stand to gain the most from higher oil prices and the pen-
dulum shift into depth are the transnational armament and oil companies, and, 
to some extent, also the oil producing countries. To explain why, it is worth 
taking a step back and considering some basic aspects of the oil business.
Making the Price Go Up
In a world ‘awash with oil,’ as Th e Economist put it, oil prices have little 
reason to rise. And the world is indeed awash with oil. According to the BP 
Statistical Review, current global proven oil reserves are equivalent to 40 produc-
tion years, up from 30 years in 1960. Of course, these reserves are ﬁ nite, so, ulti-
mately they will be exhausted. But the exhaustion process has been going on for 
a century and half, and so far it has had no systematic impact on the price of oil. 
Similarly with current production. Th e argument that oil prices ﬂ uctuate 
with ‘excess demand’ and ‘excess supply,’ although popular, does not hold much 
water. If oil prices were indeed responsive to ‘market conditions,’ we would 
³⁶.  Th e theoretical arguments in this and the remaining sections, along with exten-
sive empirical evidence, were ﬁ rst published ﬁ fteen years ago, before the – Gulf War 
(Bichler, Rowley, and Nitzan ; Nitzan, Rowley, and Bichler ; Rowley, Bichler, 
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expect to see inventories rise when the price of oil fell and vice versa when the 
price rose. In reality, though, the exact opposite has often happened. During 
the massive price increases of the 1970s and early 1980s, for instance, inventories 
actually rose instead of fell; and when the price of oil dropped during the 1980s, 
inventories fell instead of rose (Nitzan and Bichler 2002: Figure 5.5, p. 230).³⁷ 
So the price of oil has little to do with physical scarcity. Th at is obvious 
enough. But it has everything to do with perceived scarcity, and perceived scar-
city has everything to do with the Middle East. Although the region currently 
accounts for only 30 percent of world oil production, it is the only place where 
production is permanently ‘under threat.’ Th ese threats vary greatly: there is 
the threat of war; the threat of internal strife; the threat of Islamic fundamen-
talism; the threat of coups; you name it. So far, though, none of these threats 
has ever aﬀ ected the physical availability of oil at the global level. Th ere were of 
course occasional reductions in the region’s output, but these reductions were 
always compensated for by increases elsewhere, keeping the world total on an 
even keel. Yet, as we said, considerations of actual supply are beside the point. 
What counts for the price of oil is risk—or rather, the perception of risk—and of 
this exotic commodity the region has always had ample supply.
Conflicts and Profits
How have these Middle East ‘risks’ served the large weapon and oil compa-
nies? Consider ﬁ rst the armament contractors. After the end of U.S. direct mil-
itary involvement in Vietnam, domestic military spending fell sharply—from 
over 10 percent of GDP during Johnson’s presidency to less than 6 percent at 
the end of Carter’s (see Figure 16 below). Th e drop was compensated for to some 
extent by a sharp increase in military exports, which, by the end of that period, 
accounted for an estimated one third of all U.S. military-related proﬁ t.³⁸ Th e 
bulk of these exports were now going to the Middle East, which, since the early 
1970s, had replaced South-East Asia as the world’s leading market for exported 
and Nitzan ). Th is work was further extended and updated in Nitzan and Bichler 
(), Bichler and Nitzan (), Bichler and Nitzan (b: ch. ) and Nitzan and 
Bichler (: ch. ).
³⁷.  A note of caution. According to the logic of neoclassical economics, an increase 
in inventories is a sign of  ‘excess supply’ only insofar as the inventory buildup is unde-
sired. If the buildup is intentional, it should be counted as part of desired demand, not 
excess supply. Unfortunately, conventional economics cannot tell us how to distinguish 
between the two.
³⁸.  For the precise computation, see Nitzan and Bichler (: –).
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weapons and accounted for over one third of the global trade. Th e relative 
signiﬁ cance of Middle East sales for the proﬁ ts of the armament companies 
declined somewhat during Reagan’s military buildup of the early 1980s. But 
with the armament boom beginning to ﬁ zzle out in the late 1980s and turning 
to bust with the fall of communism, the Middle East once more became a major 
source of military proﬁ ts. It seems clear, therefore, that renewed conﬂ ict in the 
region, particularly with direct U.S. involvement, is very much in the interest of 
the weapon contractors. Th eir diﬀ erential proﬁ ts are likely to rise—partly from 
rising sales to the region, but mostly from increased spending at home. 
Th e impact of renewed conﬂ ict in the region on oil proﬁ ts should be equally 
large—although for a reason diﬀ erent than most people think. Th e prevailing 
view, popular among leftwing and rightwing analysts, is that the U.S. invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq are part of a larger strategy whose goal is to gain direct 
control over the region’s oil reserves. Th is view may be true. But controlling the 
region’s reserves will not, in itself, make the oil companies richer. 
Individually, each oil company of course is concerned with access to crude 
reserves. But for the oil companies as a group, the ‘access issue’ is passé. It is 
rhetoric which belongs to the breadth order of the 1950s and 1960s, a period 
when oil was in a ‘free ﬂ ow,’ when a barrel sold for $2, when royalties were low or 
non-existent, and when proﬁ ts depended mostly on production volume—that 
is, on ‘access.’ Th is situation changed fundamentally in the 1970s. Global diﬀ er-
ential accumulation swung into depth, crisis replaced prosperity, OPEC made 
the headlines, and the oil business shifted from a ‘free ﬂ ow’ to a ‘limited ﬂ ow.’ 
From then on, oil proﬁ ts came to depend not on output, but on price. During 
the following three decades, world oil production increased continuously. But 
the growth in volume was moderate, roughly 1.5 percent a year, and was prac-
tically insigniﬁ cant when compared to the wild swings in prices, which often 
doubled or halved in a single year.³⁹ 
Th e consequences for the oil companies of their business shifting from a 
‘free ﬂ ow’ to a ‘limited ﬂ ow’ are illustrated in Figure 11. Th e thicker line denotes 
the relative share of integrated oil companies in net corporate proﬁ t worldwide. 
Th e thinner line measures the ‘real’ price of oil, derived by dividing the dollar 
³⁹.  World oil production—including crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and natural gas 
liquids—rose from . million barrels a day in , to . million a day in . Th e 
price of crude oil over the same period ﬂ uctuated between a low of . per barrel and a 
high of . when measured in current dollars, and between . and . when mea-
sured in  dollars (production data from British Petroleum Annual; price data from 
International Monetary Fund Annual).
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price per barrel by the U.S. CPI, and lagged one year.⁴⁰ Th e correlation between 
the two series leaves little to the imagination. For the oil companies, diﬀ erential 
accumulation was, and still is, a matter of diﬀ erential price: the higher the rela-
tive price of oil, the higher their share of global proﬁ t.⁴¹
Figure 11 – The Price of Oil and the Global Distribution of Proﬁt*
Source:  Datastream (series codes: OILNWD for the integrated oil companies; TOTMKWD for 
world total); WEFA (series codes: L76AA&Z@C001 for the price of crude oil; L64@C111 for the 
U.S. CPI).
**    Net proﬁt is computed by dividing market value by the price/earning ratio. Data are restated 
to reﬂect changes in the series constituent companies.
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⁴⁰.  Since reported corporate earnings represent the sum of the past four quarters, 
the full impact on proﬁ t of a change in the price of oil will be felt only after a year.
⁴¹.  Th e correlation coeﬃ  cient between the two monthly series measures . (out of 
) for the period since January , and . for the period since January .
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On the face of it, this relationship seems counterintuitive. For the oil com-
panies, crude oil is the principal input, not output. It is the raw material which 
they reﬁ ne into gasoline, diesel, petrochemicals and other derivatives. Con-
sequently, should they not lose when crude oil becomes more expensive? Th e 
answer is negative. If the price of reﬁ ned products were ﬁ xed, higher crude oil 
prices would probably mean lower proﬁ t. But the price of reﬁ ned products is not 
ﬁ xed. On the contrary, it tends to move up and down with the price of crude oil, 
causing proﬁ t and cost to move not inversely with each other, but together.⁴² 
⁴².  For the mathematically inclined, assume for simplicity that the oil companies 
buy all their crude oil from others; that they reﬁ ne the oil into ﬁ nal products; and that 
they sell those products for proﬁ t. By deﬁ nition, the companies’ dollar proﬁ t (∏) is the 
multiple of their output volume (Q), the dollar cost per unit of output (C) and the deci-
mal proﬁ t markup (K), such that:
∏ = K · C  · Q
Using lower case notations to represent rates of change, we have: 
π ≈ k  + c  + q
Suppose now that the price of crude oil goes up, so that c > . Assuming that the 
other costs of production remain unchanged, what happens to proﬁ t depends on the 
relationship between c and (k + q). Proﬁ t will fall if, and only if, (k + q) < –c; in other 
words, if, and only if, the multiple of the markup and output (K · Q) falls by more than 
the rise in C. Although possible, this outcome is very unlikely for two reasons. First, 
rising crude prices tend to both ‘ﬁ re up’ the proﬁ t expectations of oil companies and 
galvanize their cooperation. Th is closer cooperation, tacit or otherwise, usually works 
to keep proﬁ t markups from falling, and often helps them go up. (Technically, there is 
nothing to prevent oil companies from changing their markups as they see ﬁ t. But in the 
absence of an external ‘shock,’ such as a hike in the price of crude oil, raising the markup 
signiﬁ cantly is too blatant an act to contemplate politically, and one which often is dif-
ﬁ cult to coordinate and maintain.) 
Now, since higher costs and higher markups lead to higher prices, one would expect 
to see consumption—and thererfore output— fall. Oil products were made more expen-
sive, so it is only natural for consumers to use less energy overall, as well as to substitute 
to alternative, non-oil sources. As it turns out, however, this negative impact usually is 
very small (in the jargon of economists, oil is  ‘price-inelastic’). To illustrate, between 
 and , the annual growth rate of crude oil consumption varied between a low 
of –. percent in  and a high of . percent in —an overall range of only . 
percent. By comparison, the range of price changes during the same period was  per-
cent—prices fell by as much as  percent in , and rose by as much as  percent in 
 (computed from British Petroleum Annual). Moreover, there was no clear correla-
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During the early 1980s, crude prices expressed in 2002 dollars exceeded 
$80 a barrel. For the world, this was the height of the ‘energy crisis.’ For the oil 
companies, it was the peak of the ‘energy boom’: their earnings reached nearly 
19 percent of all global corporate proﬁ t. Since then, however, the ‘real’ price of 
oil tumbled, and so did the proﬁ t share of the oil companies. Th e nadir was 
reached in 2000, toward the end of Clinton’s presidency, when oil proﬁ ts were 
reduced to a mere 3 percent of the world’s total. Th e last couple of years show a 
sign of reversal. With the Bush family again in the White House and the new-
speak of  ‘globalism’ giving way to the old rhetoric of  ‘imperialism,’ oil prices 
have recovered and oil companies have seen their global proﬁ t share rising to 
between 6 and 8 percent. Of course, if this reversal is to continue, the price of 
oil will have to keep on rising. And for oil to become more expensive, the Middle 
East must be kept in ‘turmoil.’
Th e position of OPEC on the issue of conﬂ ict is inherently schizophrenic. 
On the one hand, conﬂ ict could be a very risky business, particularly when you 
are part of it. On the other hand, from the narrow viewpoint of earnings, the 
interest of oil producing countries is pretty much the same as that of the oil 
companies. Th is convergence is illustrated in Figure 12. Th e thick line in the 
chart shows the net proﬁ t of the ‘Petro-Core,’ made up of the world’s six lead-
ing non government oil companies: British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), 
Chevron (Chevron-Texaco since 2000), Exxon (ExxonMobil from 1999), Mobil 
(till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000) (all changes are due to 
mergers). Th e thin line displays the value of OPEC’s petroleum exports. Th e 
correlation between the two series is both positive and tight (correlation coef-
ﬁ cient of 0.83). And the meaning of this correlation is simple enough: Middle 
East conﬂ ict, through its impact on the price of oil, has worked to boost OPEC’s 
income (as well as the income of non-OPEC producers), just as it has raised the 
proﬁ ts of the oil companies.
So let us recap again. Dominant capital is now in need of inﬂ ation. With 
mergers and acquisitions in low gear and the world toying with deﬂ ation, the 
prospects are for diﬀ erential decumulation and possibly debt deﬂ ation. For 
deﬂ ation to be averted and for diﬀ erential accumulation to continue, there 
needs to be a shift from breadth and disinﬂ ation to depth and inﬂ ation. Th is 
tion between the two movements, with higher prices often coinciding with higher rather 
than lower consumption. To sum up, then, higher prices for crude oil (c > ) tend to be 
associated with stable or even higher markups (k ≥ ), as well as indeterminate but very 
small changes in output (q ≈ ). Th e net impact of higher crude prices on oil company 
proﬁ ts therefore is almost always positive.
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shift requires a change in the mindset of  ‘price makers.’ Th e most eﬀ ective trig-
ger for such change is a return to ‘energy crises’ in the Middle East, with sizeable 
increases in the price of oil leading to higher inﬂ ation. Within dominant capital, 
the groups that stand to beneﬁ t the most from this shift are the oil and arma-
ment companies. Also likely to gain, at least from the viewpoint of earnings, are 
oil producing countries in and outside OPEC. Th e only question is whether or 
not those who stand to gain from the shift can actually make it happen.
The Coalition
Th e answer remains to be seen. What does seem clear, though, is that the 
‘political machinery’ necessary to bring this shift is presently in place. As we 
have described elsewhere at great length, this political machinery ﬁ rst emerged 
Figure 12 – OPEC and the Oil Companies
Source:  OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin; Fortune.
*   British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (till 2000), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 
1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due 
to merger.
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in the early 1970s in the form a Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition between the 
large armament, construction, oil and ﬁ nancial corporations, in conjunction 
with OPEC and key Western governments. Th e key feature uniting this coali-
tion was a common interest in some measure of conﬂ ict in the Middle East and 
in high oil prices. 
Representatives and owners of key companies within this coalition have 
grown increasingly intertwined with the hawkish administrations of Richard 
Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and George Bush Sr. Even Jimmy Carter, 
who adopted a more conciliatory approach towards Middle East aﬀ airs, did not 
manage to signiﬁ cantly restrict their leverage. 
 One result of this ‘capital-state symbiosis’ was to keep U.S. energy policy 
conveniently fuzzy. ‘For many decades now,’ complained the authors of the 
Baker Report, ‘the United States has been without an energy policy’ (Morse 
and Jaﬀ e 2001: 4). Indeed. According to Daniel Yergin’s analysis of over one 
thousand State Department cables and papers obtained under the Freedom of 
Information Act, between 1974 and 1981 the U.S. government in fact objected to 
higher oil prices, but it didn’t want to see those prices lowered either…. (Yergin 
1991: 84, 643).
Oﬃ  cially, of course, the government of the United States was ‘fundamen-
tally, irrevocably committed’ to maintaining the free ﬂ ow of oil, and ‘the interest 
in the United States is bound to be cheap energy prices.’ Th at, at least, was how 
Vice President George Bush Sr. put it 1986 (New York Times, 7 April 1986). 
Interestingly, though, Bush made this declaration during his emergency trip 
to Saudi Arabia, a trip whose explicit purpose was to persuade the kingdom to 
cut output in order to raise the price of oil! Th e ‘free market’ was all good and 
dandy, but there was a limit. As Bush articulated it to the Saudis: ‘Th ere is some 
point at which the national security interests of the United States say, “Hey, we 
must have a strong, viable domestic interest”’ (ibid.).
Unlike with oil, the policy position on armament seemed unambiguous. 
Th e various U.S. administrations, along with the Soviet Union and count-
less other countries, did their best to arm the Middle East to the teeth. Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Iran under the Shah, Iran under Khomeini, Kuwait, 
Jordan, the Gulf Emirates—all received massive weapon shipments. Th ese 
shipments, of course, were all made in the interest of  ‘stabilization,’ as Secre-
tary of State William Rogers put it (cited in Engler 1977: 242). ‘Th e balance of 
power,’ explained the quintessential go-between, Henry Kissinger, ‘is a kind of 
policeman, whose responsibility is to prevent peaceful countries from feeling 
impotent and aggressors from becoming reckless’ (Kissinger 1981: 81). 
Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on the viewpoint, the ‘balance of 
power’ provided little stability to the region. In fact, it seems safe to conclude 
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it has done the exact opposite. Since 1967, the region has had numerous major 
conﬂ icts, all fought with imported weapons, and all connected directly or indi-
rectly to oil. 
12. ‘energy conflicts’
Th e connection between oil and conﬂ ict in the Middle East is hardly a nov-
elty. Some conﬂ icts—for instance, the 1990–1 war between Iraq and the U.S.-
led coalition—have been attributed partly to a struggle over the control of crude 
reserves, whereas others—speciﬁ cally the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 
and the Iran-Iraq conﬂ ict of 1980–8—were seen as having aggravated ongoing 
energy crises. Most of those studying the subject have concentrated on the link 
between conﬂ ict on the one hand and oil prices and exports on the other. Few 
if any, however, have paid attention to the more subtle relationship between 
conﬂ ict and oil proﬁ ts. 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 provide summary statistics on the relative ﬁ nan-
cial performance of the ‘Petro-Core’ referred to earlier. Figure 13 displays 
two measures of return on equity—one for the Petro-Core, the other for the 
Fortune 500 group of companies. Comparison of these two measures gives an 
indication for the relative performance of the Petro-Core. When the Petro-
Core’s rate of return ‘beats’ the Fortune 500 average, it accumulates diﬀ eren-
tially. When it falls short of that average, it decumulates diﬀ erentially. In the 
ﬁ gure, these latter instances are darkened in black, and are labelled ‘danger 
zones’ for a reason which we shall explain shortly.
Th e same information is presented somewhat diﬀ erently in Figure 14. Here 
we measure the rate of diﬀ erential accumulation, ﬁ rst, by taking for each year 
the diﬀ erence between the rate of return of the Petro-Core and the average rate 
of return of the Fortune 500, and then expressing this diﬀ erence as a percent of 
the Fortune 500’s (in order to ‘standardize’ the result). Here, too, instances of 
diﬀ erential decumulation by the Petro-Core are darkened in black and labelled 
as ‘danger zones.’
Th e reason for using the term ‘danger zone’ has to do with the 11 ‘explosion’ 
symbols in Figure 14. Each of these symbols represents the breakout of a major 
Middle East conﬂ ict—the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the 1979 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the onset of the 1980–8 Iran-Iraq War, the 1982 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1990–1 Gulf War, the 2000 Palestinian Inti-
fada, the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and, ﬁ nally, the 2002–3 second Gulf 
War. As it turns out, this string of conﬂ icts has been intimately connected to 
the diﬀ erential accumulation of the oil companies, and in more than one way. 
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First, since the late 1960s, all major Middle-East conﬂ icts were followed 
by a period during which the Petro-Core beat the Fortune 500 average. In 
this sense, and whatever their ultimate ‘cause,’ these were all ‘energy conﬂ icts.’ 
Now, that ﬁ nding, although striking, should not surprise the reader: as we have 
already seen, diﬀ erential oil proﬁ ts are intimately correlated with the relative, or 
‘real’ price of oil; the ‘real’ price of oil in turn is highly responsive to Middle East 
‘risks,’ real or imaginary; these ‘risks’ tend to jump in preparation for and during 
armed conﬂ ict; and as the ‘risks’ mount, they bring higher ‘real’ oil prices and 
Figure 13 – Return on Equity: The Petro-Core* versus the Fortune 500**
Source:  Fortune; Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
*   British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (till 2000), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 
1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due 
to merger.
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**   Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only industrial corporations (ﬁrms deriving at least 
half their sales revenues from manufacturing or mining). From 1994 onward, the list includes all 
corporations. For 1992–3, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 
special charges.
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therefore diﬀ erential accumulation for the oil companies. Th e important thing 
to note here, though, is that ‘energy conﬂ icts’ have led not to higher oil proﬁ ts as 
such, but to higher diﬀ erential oil proﬁ ts. As Figure 13 shows, in 1969–70, 1975, 
1980–2, 1985, 1991 and 2001–2, the rate of return on equity of the ‘Petro-Core’ 
actually fell; but in all cases it fell more slowly than the average rate of return of 
the Fortune 500, enabling the ‘Petro-Core’ to comfortably ‘beat the average.’
Figure 14 – The Petro-Core’s Diﬀerential Accumulation* and Middle
Source:  Fortune; Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
*   Diﬀerential accumulation is deﬁned as the relative deviation of the return on equity of the 
Petro-Core from the return on equity of the Fortune 500. The Petro-Core comprises British 
Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (till 2000), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), 
Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due to 
merger. Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only industrial corporations (ﬁrms deriving at 
least half their sales revenues from manufacturing or mining). From 1994 onward, the list 
includes all corporations. For 1992–3, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without 
SFAS 106 special charges.
**  The speciﬁc ‘Energy Conﬂicts’ are listed in the text.
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A second remarkable fact is that, with the exception of 1996–7, the Petro-
Core always ‘needed’ a conﬂ ict to pull itself of a the ‘danger zone.’⁴³ Th is fact 
should already be highly disturbing. It is one thing for war to help the oil com-
panies beat the average. It is another matter when the oil companies can beat 
the average only through war.
But the most important fact is that all of the conﬂ icts indicated in the chart 
were preceded by a period during which the Petro-Core suﬀ ered diﬀ erential 
decumulation.⁴⁴ Th e ﬁ rst fact, although striking, may be dismissed as coin-
cidence. Th e second fact is a bit more disconcerting, yet still in the realm of 
remote possibilities. But what should we make of the third fact? How could it 
be that diﬀ erential decumulation by a few large oil companies always ‘triggers’ 
wars in the Middle East? Or is this a ﬂ uke as well?
Perhaps it is. But in passing judgment on this matter, it is important to note 
that most of these conﬂ icts were endorsed, and sometimes openly supported, 
by various U.S. governments, and that these governments were never at arm’s 
length from the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition (Cf. Bichler and Nitzan 
1996; Nitzan and Bichler 2002: ch. 5). Th us, in the months leading to the 1967 
Israeli-Arab War, the United States actively supported Israel’s plan to ‘break 
Nasser’s bones asunder.’ In 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had been warned by the 
oil companies and Saudi Arabia of the pending attack on Israel, but chose to do 
nothing about it, not even notify the Israelis. In 1979, President Carter, under 
the advice of Kissinger, contributed to the post-Revolution turmoil in Iran by 
oﬀ ering asylum to the Shah and freezing Iranian assets in the United States. 
Th e United States gave the green light to both of Israel’s invasions of Leba-
non—the ﬁ rst in 1979 and the second in 1982. Th e U.S. government ﬁ nanced 
and supplied the Mujahedin after the Soviet invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Th e 
U.S. government encouraged Iraq to attack Iran in 1980, and then supplied 
armaments to both sides in order to prolong the conﬂ ict. Th e 1991 Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait was a classic ‘sting’ operation. Th e U.S. gave Saddam Hussein reason 
to believe that Washington would do nothing if he invaded Kuwait, only to 
reverse its stance the moment he attacked. Th e Administration of George Bush 
Jr. supported Ariel Sharon from the moment he walked on the Temple Mount 
⁴³.   Although there was no ‘oﬃ  cial’ conﬂ ict in –, there was plenty of violence, 
including an Iraqi invasion of Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks. 
⁴⁴.  In the late s and early s, and then in the early s, diﬀ erential decu-
mulation was sometimes followed by a string of conﬂ icts stretching over several years, 
with the result being a longer period between the initial spell of diﬀ erential decumulation 
and some of the subsequent crises.
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in 2000 and throughout the resulting Intifada. Finally, the background to the 
September 11 attacks is still engulfed in mystery if not secrecy; but the enthu-
siasm of Bush Jr. to use these attacks as a pretext for invading Afghanistan and 
Iraq is hardly in doubt. 
Of course, these observations themselves do not mean that Middle East 
wars were ‘premeditated’ in the boardrooms of the Weapondollar-Petrodol-
lar Coalition and that the U.S. government simply ‘followed orders,’ triggering 
conﬂ ict whenever it suited the Coalition. It is almost a cliché to say that conﬂ ict 
and war are never mono-causal. Th ey always occur within a highly complex his-
torical context, and that context can never be reduced to a ‘functional’ relation-
ship between several ‘variables.’ But in the case of the Middle East, the context 
of conﬂ ict cannot be comprehended solely from the narrow perspective of the 
warring factions; it cannot be understood without reference to its own conti-
nuities and apparent ‘regularities’; and it cannot be analyzed separately from 
broader world developments.
Our own view is that Middle East conﬂ icts were integral to the power 
processes of global accumulation. During the 1970s and 1980s, these conﬂ icts 
helped trigger and sustain a global depth regime of stagﬂ ation—which in turn 
contributed to the diﬀ erential accumulation of dominant capital in general, and 
of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition in particular. In the process, this 
coalition had become increasingly fused with its ‘parent’ governments on the 
one hand and its OPEC ‘hosts’ on the other, leading to a growing ‘capital-state 
symbiosis’ between them. 
 Whether or not there was ‘conspiracy’ here, and what the precise nature of 
such a ‘conspiracy’ was, remains an open question. Unfortunately, these types 
of issues are not the usual staple of primetime television. Occasionally, however, 
the truth does come to light, albeit with a little delay. Th e 1971 publication by 
Daniel Ellsberg of the Pentagon Papers, for example, revealed the clandestine 
story behind the Vietnam War (Chomsky, Zinn, and United States Depart-
ment of Defense 1971). Similarly, the 1975 declassiﬁ cation of the 1950 National 
Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC 68) showed that the military buildup 
of the Cold War was explicitly designed, at least partly, as a ‘Keynesian stim-
ulant’ (National Security Council 1950). Perhaps in due course someone will 
publish the secret ‘Exxon Papers’ or a declassiﬁ ed ‘NSC Report on Energy and 
War in the Middle East,’ thereby opening a window into the backroom story of 
Energy Conﬂ icts in the region. 
One way or another, it is clear that during the 1970s and early 1980s the 
general context was highly favorable to conﬂ ict. Th e diﬀ erential interests of the 
various groups described above ﬁ t nicely with the realist rhetoric of the ‘Cold 
War,’ ‘spheres of inﬂ uence,’ the ‘national interest’ and ‘access’ to raw materials. 
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Th e net result of these converging interests, institutions and organizations was 
to make conﬂ ict look more ‘natural,’ which in turn strengthened the hand of 
those who beneﬁ ted from such conﬂ ict and weakened those who opposed it. 
In short, it was ‘open season.’ War was less likely to be prevented, more likely 
to erupt (sometimes with active encouragement), and less likely to be stopped 
once under way.
13. breadth and the rise of  ‘neoliberalism’
Th e importance of diﬀ erential accumulation regimes for understanding 
Middle East conﬂ icts is all the more evident when considering the relative 
‘pause’ in these conﬂ icts during the late 1980s and 1990s and the way this pause 
was connected with the shift from depth to breadth. Since the late 1980s, the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition was running into increasing diﬃ  culties. 
Th e proﬁ t share of oil companies tumbled to unprecedented lows (Figure 11). 
Diﬀ erential decumulation by the Petro-Core also proved far more diﬃ  cult to 
resolve (Figure 13 and Figure 14). During the earlier period of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, drops in its diﬀ erential performance were short. Every drop was 
quickly followed by conﬂ ict, which in turn allowed the oil companies again to 
beat the average. By contrast, from the mid 1980s onward, wars became fewer 
and farther between, and their eﬀ ect on diﬀ erential performance usually was 
disappointing. Worse still, in 1991, George Bush Sr., a Weapondollar-Petrodol-
lar loyalist who had just ﬁ nished orchestrating a major international war, was 
more or less forced to announce the dawn of a ‘New World Order’ of peace. His 
successor, Bill Clinton, was already a declared ‘peacenik’ who moved swiftly 
toward resolving the Arab-Israeli conﬂ ict. World military budgets during the 
1990s fell sharply, arms exports went into a tailspin and the large armament 
contractors were reduced to a mere shadow of their past glory. ‘War proﬁ t’ and 
conﬂ ict were evidently out. Everyone was talking about ‘peace dividend,’ ‘global-
ization,’ ‘emerging markets’ and the ‘end of history.’
Th e change certainly was inﬂ uenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the disintegration of communism. But that disintegration itself was intimately 
connected to the expanding frontiers of diﬀ erential accumulation. Th e last 
‘envelope,’ which till then had separated the First World from the Second and 
Th ird, was ﬁ nally broken, triggering a swift shift from depth to breadth. With 
communism gone, developing countries were more or less compelled to become 
‘emerging markets’ open to Western investment. For dominant capital, corpo-
rate merger had ﬁ nally gone global. Civilian high-tech was promoted as the new 
panacea, investors’ optimism was relentlessly hyped up, and market indices and 
equity valuation were sent into the stratosphere. Th e winds of  ‘neoliberalism,’ 
‘deregulation’ and ‘openness’ began blowing stronger and stronger. 
Dominant Capital and the New Wars 315
By the early 1990s, dominant capital as a whole shifted from relying on 
depth through stagﬂ ation to emphasizing breadth through corporate amalga-
mation. But the shift also involved a realignment within dominant capital. Th e 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition that had led the earlier depth regime was 
now challenged by a new ‘Technodollar-Mergerdollar Coalition’ geared toward 
civilian high-tech, global expansion and corporate mergers. 
Although there is some overlap between the two coalitions, their charac-
teristics are fairly distinct. Th e top defense contractors are mostly high-tech 
companies, but they rely largely on military orders. By contrast, the large high-
tech companies of the Technodollar-Mergerdollar Coalition sell mostly to the 
civilian market.⁴⁵ Similarly, while both coalitions went through massive corpo-
rate consolidation during the 1990s, in the former case the process was largely 
defensive, whereas in the latter it was highly aggressive. 
Th e reversal of fortune of these coalitions is evident in Figure 15. Th e chart 
shows the net proﬁ t of two corporate clusters, both expressed as a percent of 
total world proﬁ t: integrated oil and defense companies which proxy the Weap-
ondollar-Petrodollar Coalition, and information technology hardware, telecom 
hardware and computer software and services, which together proxy the new 
Technodollar-Mergerdollar Coalition. 
As the data indicate, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition reigned 
supreme till the early 1980s. At the peak of its power, in 1981, it scooped over 20 
percent of the global proﬁ t pie. Th en came a long decline, with the slack picked 
up, particularly since the early 1990s, by the Technodollar-Mergerdollar Coali-
tion. Toward the end of the 2000s, the former’s share was reduced to nearly 3 
percent, whereas the latter’s soared to 14 percent. 
 For the new coalition, high energy prices were a mortal threat. More 
expensive oil would have spoiled business conﬁ dence and growth in ‘emerg-
ing markets,’ upset capital mobility and merger prospects and interfered with 
⁴⁵.  Global data on the ‘military dependency’ of large companies are diﬃ  cult to col-
late, but the situation in the United States, which is probably indicative of the broader 
picture, seems fairly clear. Between  and , the  leading U.S. defense contrac-
tors typically got  to  percent of their revenues from prime contract awards with 
the Department of Defense (Nitzan and Bichler : –). Th is ratio has surely 
increased with recent mergers in the sector. In , the comparable ﬁ gure for the  
leading civilian high-tech companies based in the United States was a mere . per-
cent (computed from the Fortune  directory and from U.S. Department of Defense 
Annual). Th e latter companies often act as subcontractors to the leading defense ﬁ rms, 
but the magnitudes involved are small relative to their total sales and do not change the 
overall picture.
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Figure 15 – Shares of Global Net Corporate Proﬁt* 
Source:  Datastream (series codes TOTMKWD for world total; OILINWD for integrated oil; DEFENWD 
for defense; INFOHWD for information technology hardware; TELEQWD for telecom equipment; 
SFTCSWD for software and computer services).
*   Net proﬁt is computed by dividing market value by the price/earning ratio. Series denote 
monthly data smoothed as 12–month moving averages.
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the hyping up of the stock market. And since breadth accumulation beneﬁ ted 
dominant capital as a whole, both rhetoric and policy tilted toward supporting 
the new regime. Experts began to sing the praises of a ‘new economy’ of techni-
cal progress and inﬂ ationless growth. Government deﬁ cits were made smaller 
and economies were deregulated. Borders were opened and military spend-
ing was reduced. Th e Middle East was put on a fast track toward becoming 
the next ‘emerging market,’ with peace deals popping up all over and frequent 
conferences recounting the wonders of regional cooperation and development. 
Even Israel’s dominant capital, which had made its greatest diﬀ erential fortunes 
during the depth regime of conﬂ ict and stagﬂ ation, bought into the dream of a 
‘New Middle East’ with Israel as its ‘Silicon Waddi.’ Breadth accumulation was 
clearly the way to go. 
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14. the current crossroads
Regrouping
Th e Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition did not die, however. Far from it. 
During the 1990s, it was busy regrouping its organizations, realigning its poli-
tics and reworking its ideology. Th e ﬁ rst task was amalgamation. By the end of 
the decade, merger had fused many of the Petro-Core giants, formerly known 
as the ‘Seven Sisters,’ into even larger entities. Similarly with the armament 
companies. Clinton’s government and the EU encouraged them to bundle up, 
and within several years there emerged a new leading group of companies, the 
‘Seven Angels of Armageddon,’ all intricately tied through joint development 
projects.⁴⁶ 
In the meantime, the policy hawks were busy drafting future plans. In 1996, 
Th e Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem tabled a 
report entitled ‘A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’ (Perle 
et al. 1996). Th e study, written under the auspices of the Netanyahu govern-
ment, called for a drastic change in Israeli policy. Th e ‘New Middle East’ had 
been a complete failure, the paper argued. Comprehensive peace was a mirage 
and paying for it with land was suicidal. Instead, Israel should strive for a ‘bal-
ance of power.’ Forging an alliance with Turkey and Jordan, Israel should con-
tain, destabilize and roll back Syria, its strongest foe. If needed, Israel should 
not shy from openly attacking Syria, militarily, both in Lebanon and on its own 
soil. Furthermore, ‘Since Iraq’s future could aﬀ ect the strategic balance in the 
Middle East profoundly,’ the eﬀ ort to roll back Syria ‘can focus on removing 
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq—an important Israeli strategic objective 
in its own right—as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions.’
Interestingly, the team that wrote the report was entirely American, and 
many of its members would soon become key ﬁ gures in the government of 
George Bush Jr. Th e leader of the team was Richard Perle, former assistant 
⁴⁶.  By the late s, the world’s leading oil companies were Exxon-Mobil (with 
 net proﬁ ts of . billion), Royal-Dutch Shell (. billion), BP-Amoco ( bil-
lion), Total Fina Elf (. billion), Chevron-Texaco (. billion) and ENI (.) billion. 
Th e ‘Seven Angels of Armageddon,’ a nickname suggested to us by Gibin Hong, consisted 
of Lockheed-Martin (with  defense sales of  billion), Boeing ( billion), BAE 
Systems ( billion), Raytheon ( billion), General Dynamics ( billion), EADS 
( billion) and Northrop Grumman ( billion) (ﬁ gures from Nitzan and Bichler : 
Table ., p. ).
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secretary of defense for international security policy and future chairman of the 
Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board under Bush. Other members included lawyer 
Douglas Feith, who became Bush’s under secretary of policy at the Pentagon; 
Meyrav Wurmser and her husband, David Wurmser, who became special assis-
tant to John Bolton, Bush’s under secretary for arms control and international 
security at the State Department; and James Colbert of the neo-conservative 
Jewish Institute for National Security Aﬀ airs in Washington, whose advisory 
board included future vice-president Dick Cheney, John Bolton and Douglas 
Feith (Whitaker 2002).
In 1998, the chorus of  ‘realist’ voices grew louder and the focus on Saddam 
Hussein sharper. A group of 42 prominent public ﬁ gures, led by Donald 
Rumsfeld, wrote an open letter to President Clinton, calling for a ‘comprehen-
sive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime’ 
(Rumsfeld 1998). In a few years, many of the letter’s signatories would assume 
key positions in the Bush government, ready to make good on their recommen-
dations.
Th e broad blueprint for how to carry out these recommendations was metic-
ulously laid out in a 90-page report, ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses,’ (Donnelly 
2000). Th e report was published by the Project for the New American Century 
(PNAC), whose founders included future vice-president Dick Cheney, future 
defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, future deputy defense secretary Paul Wol-
fowitz, Cheney’s future chief of staﬀ  Lewis Libby, and Bush’s future ambas-
sador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad. Th e principal means of promoting 
‘American global leadership,’ argued the report, was higher military spending. 
‘[T]he extended paying of the “peace dividend” and the creation of today’s fed-
eral budget surplus, the product of increased tax revenues and reduced defense 
spending—has [sic] created a severe “defense deﬁ cit,” totaling tens of billions 
of dollars annually’ (Donnelly 2000: 69). Indeed, according to the report, the 
postwar decline in military spending as a share of GDP, illustrated in Figure 16, 
was pushing America toward a moment of truth. Th e trend had to be reversed 
before it was too late. To this eﬀ ect, America needed a major ‘military trans-
formation’—although such transformation, the report observed, was ‘likely to 
be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl 
Harbor’ (pp. 50–51).
In order to eﬀ ect this ‘transformation,’ whether long or short, the Weapon-
dollar-Petrodollar Coalition ﬁ rst had to reclaim the White House. Th is was an 
important task, and the eﬀ orts put into it were commensurate with the stakes. 
Massive ﬁ nancial support, legal pressures, electoral maneuvers, deceit and out-
right forgery were all brought to bear. And the strategy worked. In January 
2001, the Coalition had George Bush Jr. safely installed in the Oval Oﬃ  ce. 
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The End of Breadth
In retrospect, then, all seemed ready for a ‘new Pearl Harbor’: the oil and 
armament sectors had been centralized, their corporate members all eager for 
higher oil prices and larger military budgets; an ultra-hawkish ideology had 
been articulated and aggressively peddled to policy makers, intellectuals and 
the masses; and the new U.S. Administration seemed prepared to go to war 
on a moment’s notice. But these conditions alone, although necessary, were not 
suﬃ  cient. It was also essential to have dominant capital on board, and that con-
dition, too, was fulﬁ lled in 2001. With mergers having collapsed and the drop in 
stagﬂ ation apparently reversed, the pendulum of diﬀ erential accumulation has 
began to swing (Figure 7). Th e collective mindset of dominant capital has ﬁ nally 
started to shift from breadth to depth.
Figure 16 – U.S. Military Spending as a Share of GDP
Source:  Nils Petter Gleditsch, The Peace Dividend (Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 1996); 
U.S. Department of Commerce through WEFA (series codes: GDP for GDP; GFML for military 
spending).
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In our view, without this change in the outlook of dominant capital, 
September 11 probably would not have become America’s ‘new Pearl Harbor.’ 
Had the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon occurred not in 2001, 
but in the mid 1990s, at a time when the stock market boom was still in full 
swing, when ‘emerging markets’ were still red hot, and when high-tech mergers 
were reshaping the corporate landscape, it is doubtful that a U.S. administra-
tion—even one headed by George Bush Jr.—would have been able to substitute 
‘inﬁ nite war’ for ‘neoliberal globalization.’ In this sense, the 2001 timing of the 
attacks was ‘perfect’ (if that is the proper word). Th e attacks came after the 
stock market had been punctured, after the merger boom had collapsed, after 
the neoliberal rhetoric had begun to backﬁ re in ‘emerging markets,’ and after 
deﬂ ation had emerged as a threat. When the Twin Towers came down, the 
Technodollar-Mergerdollar Coalition was already in tatters, its proﬁ ts melting, 
its neoliberal vision tarnished. Dominant capital was ﬁ nally ripe for a ‘regime 
change’ in the nature of diﬀ erential accumulation, ready to accept the resur-
rected Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition as its new locomotive, ready to shift 
from ‘peace dividends’ back to ‘war proﬁ ts.’ 
The New Wars
It was against this background that George Bush Jr., on the night of Septem-
ber 11, could conﬁ dently dictate to his diary: ‘Th e Pearl Harbor of the twenty-
ﬁ rst century took place today; We think it’s Osama bin Laden…. We cannot 
allow a terrorist thug to hold us hostage. My hope is that this will provide an 
opportunity for us to rally the world against terrorism’ (Balz and Woodward 
2002). Th e next day, secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that the 
United States use the opportunity to go after Iraq. Th e suggestion had many 
supporters, but, in the end, on the counter advice of secretary of state Colin 
Powell, it was decided to cater to ‘American public opinion’ and, instead, begin 
with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Woodward and Balz 2002).
Oﬃ  cially, the new wars are against terrorism. Unoﬃ  cially, they are about 
securing cheap oil. And, so far, they have ‘failed’ on both counts. Terrorism 
remains unabated, and oil, instead of becoming cheaper, has grown more expen-
sive. And, yet, to the surprise of many, despite this double failure, the ‘business 
community’ remains quiet: ‘why is Wall Street silent on the war?’ asked Bloom-
berg commentator Michael Lewis (2003). Obviously, the reason is not lack of 
interest. If anything, the new wars are probably the most ‘commodiﬁ ed’ in his-
tory, with every move and development on the ground immediately reverberat-
ing thought the entire grid of ﬁ nancial markets. Furthermore, the few commen-
tators who do make their opinions known show that dominant capital is well 
aware of the issues at hand. Th us, George Soros (2003) openly blamed Bush for 
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his ‘inﬂ ated sense of supremacy,’ warning that ‘war on terrorism cannot be the 
guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy.’ Th e dangers inherent in such policy 
were explained by Bill Gross of PIMCO, one of the world’s largest bond man-
agement companies: ‘Investors must know that perpetual containment [of ter-
rorism] entails costs—not just monetary but those involving potential policy 
reversals that have formed the backbone of America’s economic hegemony for 
nearly seven decades.’ Free trade, open capital markets and a strong dollar now 
were all at risk. ‘Because of 9/11 and our necessity to ﬁ ght a new kind of war,’ 
says Gross, ‘America is losing its peace dividend at a time when—because of 
high debt, over consumption, and reﬂ ective trade deﬁ cit—we cannot aﬀ ord to’ 
(Gross 2003). Clearly, then, dominant capital understands full well that the new 
wars could mark the end of neoliberalism, at least for the time being.
So why the silence? According to Michael Lewis, the reason is fear. Th e 
‘fear of saying the wrong thing,’ which, in his opinion reveals the ‘impotence of 
the putatively powerful.’ And perhaps he is right. But there is another possibil-
ity, the one argued in this paper. Th e tentative reversal shown in Figure 7—the 
fall of the amalgamation index and the coinciding upturn of the stagﬂ ation 
index—suggests that the pendulum of diﬀ erential accumulation may have 
begun swinging from breadth to depth. In our view, dominant capital under-
stands that the new wars could seriously undermine neoliberal globalization. 
But unlike diehard ‘peaceniks’ such as George Soros and Bill Gross, most of its 
members feel that the new trajectory of conﬂ ict is presently better for accumu-
lation, and therefore say little and do even less. In the current historical con-
junction, this inaction allows the new wars to continue and the pendulum to 
swing from breadth to depth.
And yet this new trajectory remains precarious. Th e Weapondollar-Petro-
dollar Coalition, which once more occupies the driver’s seat within dominant 
capital, needs an atmosphere of permanent threat. Military spending has just 
begun recovering from its abyss (Figure 16). Th ese expenditures could continue 
rising—but only if the threats they are supposed to answer can be ‘demon-
strated’ as signiﬁ cant and credible. And in a unipolar world, without an oppos-
ing superpower, those threats could only be ‘demonstrated’ through open and 
continued conﬂ ict. 
From this perspective, the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq provided 
a good start, with plenty of media coverage and no end in sight. But unfortu-
nately for the NeoCons and the armament companies, so far the campaigns 
have proven far too ‘eﬃ  cient.’ Th eir combined cost for 2002–3 is estimated 
around $100–120 billion. Spread over two years, this sum is equivalent roughly 
to 0.5 percent of U.S. GDP. A longer occupation of Iraq, including reconstruc-
tion and interest expenses, would cost much more—$418 billion over ten years 
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according to a ‘worst-case scenario’ published by the House Budget Committee 
of the Democratic Party (Spratt 2003). But, then, even this inﬂ ated sum would 
represent a mere 0.3 percent of GDP. As illustrated in Figure 16, these ratios 
remain far smaller than the ‘requirements’ of past conﬂ icts. And the Pentagon, 
aware of these limitations, projects military spending over the next ﬁ ve years 
to rise by only 4.1 percent annually, roughly in line with GDP. Of course, the 
situation would change dramatically if there were new conﬂ icts in the pipeline, 
which perhaps explains the endless hype about the Axis of Evil and the need to 
‘spread democracy.’ 
Th e outlook for the oil companies is similar. For them, too, the war in Iraq 
was won way too easily. As these lines are being written (early 2003), the price 
of crude oil hovers at around $25 to $32 per barrel—higher than before the war, 
but still far below previous records (Figure 11). Unless conﬂ ict resumes—either 
through new campaigns or through more intense skirmishes with ‘terrorists’ 
and ‘fundamentalists’—the likelihood is for oil prices to fall, and for the oil 
companies to again suﬀ er diﬀ erential decumulation. And so, here too the Axis 
of Evil has a role to play—although as far as the oil companies are concerned, 
that ‘role’ should not deviate too far from the oil regions. 
Finally, so far the new wars and rising oil prices have managed to keep the 
world from sliding into deﬂ ation (Figure 10). But the danger remains. And it is 
on this issue that the fate of the Bush Administration, the Weapondollar-Pet-
rodollar Coalition, and the nature of diﬀ erential accumulation more broadly, all 
hinge. Many big capitalists, whose instincts remain Keynesian, believe that the 
new wars will be ‘expansionary’ and that expansion is inﬂ ationary. ‘Keynesian 
theory might be old,’ explain the analysts of Stratfor Forecasting to their clients, 
‘but it does teach us a basic truth, which is that the cure for deﬂ ation is economic 
stimulation through government spending…. So anyone who was concerned 
about deﬂ ation should be relieved that the Bush administration has adopted 
Keynes’ (Anonymous 2003). Of course, since inﬂ ation tends to appear as stag-
ﬂ ation, the Keynesian hopefuls may well be puzzled to see prices start rising in 
the midst of stagnation. But as long as inﬂ ation does rise and pricing power is 
restored, they will be happy to keep ‘silent on the war.’ However, if the new wars 
fail to deliver—because the conﬂ icts are not suﬃ  ciently ‘intense,’ because the 
hostilities do not create enough ‘scarcity’ in the oil market, or because inﬂ ation 
does not ‘respond’ to higher oil prices—the opposition from within dominant 
capital will likely become much more vocal. 
And, in this sense, perhaps little has changed. ‘It is a sad world indeed,’ 
commented Michal Kalecki at the height of the Vietnam War, ‘where the fate 
of all mankind depends upon the ﬁ ght between two competing groups within 
American big business. Th is, however, is not quite new: many far-reaching 
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upheavals in human history started from a cleavage at the top of the ruling 
class’ (Kalecki 1967: 114). 
Update (June 2004)
Since this paper was submitted for publication in June 2003, the U.S. ‘vic-
tory’ in Iraq has proven illusive and the ‘war on terror’ rather diﬃ  cult to win. 
Guerrilla warfare, terrorist attacks, counterattacks and reprisals have intensi-
ﬁ ed in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. Th e price of crude oil has risen 
further, and it currently hovers around $40 per barrel. In parallel, the ‘risk’ of 
deﬂ ation seems to have subsided. Despite the presence of ample idle produc-
tive capacity, inﬂ ation has picked up and the Federal Reserve Board recently 
announced it is ready to step on the monetary breaks should the need arise. For 
the ﬁ rst time since the 1980s, analysts have began contemplating the prospects 
of renewed stagﬂ ation. Increasingly, this new reality seems obvious. Indeed, 
many experts, who until only a year ago dismissed this new reality as ‘nonsense,’ 
now know to tell us that they have ‘anticipated it all along.’
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